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ALONA E. EVANS*

The Political Refugee in United
States Immigration Law and Practice t
I The Political Refugee and the Immigration Laws - A Short Survey
The "tradition of the United States as a humanitarian sanctuary"'

is woven into the fabric of American history. In colonial times religious
persecution brought refugees from England, Germany, and France. At
the beginning of the Republic, the French Revolution led to an influx
of political refugees. In the nineteenth century political refugees came
from Poland and Germany and religious and racial refugees from Russia
and the Ottoman Empire. The turbulent twentieth century has brought
refugees from Europe and Asia, and, most recently, in steady numbers
from Cuba. Those who have fled religious, racial, or political persecution, and who may be described as "political refugees," as distinguished
from persons who have fled from natural disasters, have found
territorial asylum in the United States, not by right, for " . . . the
United States does not recognize or subscribe to as part of international
law, the so-called doctrine of asylum," 2 but by grant of the government
* ALONA ELIZABETH EVANS. Chairman and Professor, Department of Political Science,
Wellesley College; graduate of Duke University (A.B.) (Ph.D.); member of the Board of Editors,
American Journal of International Law; Chairman, Committee on Legal Problems of Asylum,
American Branch of the International Law Association; member, Panel of Contributors,
International Law Reports, Cambridge University; frequent contributor to journals in the fields
of international law and political science.
t This study was undertaken on behalf of the Committee on Legal Problems of Political
Asylum of the American Branch, International Law Association. The author wishes to express
her appreciation to Jack Wasserman, Esq., a member of the Committee, for his valuable
criticism of the study. The views presented in the study are solely those of the author. The
study was completed on March 1, 1968.
1 President Kennedy to Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, Ribicoff, Jan. 27,
1961, Public Papersof the Presidents,John F. Kennedy, 1961, 17-18.
2 United States reservation to Convention on Asylum, Havana, 1928. 2 G. HACKWORTH,

DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 647. The courts have pointed out upon a number of
occasions that an alien has no right to asylum in the United States e.g. Ex parte Kurth, 28
F.Supp. 258, 26364 (S.D.Cal. 1939), appeal dismissed, 106 F.2d 1003 (9th Cir. 1939);
Soewapadji v. Wixon, 157 F.2d 289, 290 (9th Cir. 1946), cert. denied 329 U.S. 792 (1946),
rehearingdenied 329 U.S. 833 (1947).
,
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for humanitarian reasons, in recognition of the responsibility of a free
people toward the politically oppressed, or for considerations of foreign
3
policy.
The grant of territorial asylum is controlled by the sovereign
state's inherent power over the admission and expulsion of aliens.4
Under United States immigration laws, a political refugee may enter the
country as a quota immigrant,' as a special immigrant from a Western
Hemisphere country, 6 or as a non-quota immigrant.' Or he may be
granted conditional entry as a refugee' or enter on parole at the
3 2 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 622. See, Annual Message of
President to Congress, Jan. 10, 1957, Public Papersof the Presidents,Dwight D. Eisenhower,

1957, 27.
Territorial asylum is the most common form of the practice of political asylum. Asylum
may also be granted in diplomatic missions, consular offices, public ships and aircraft. Upon
occasion, it has been granted in a merchant ship. More innovative is the reported grant of
asylum in American oil rigs off the coast of the Eastern region of Nigeria, New York Times,
July 30, 1967, 3:5 (city ed. unless otherwise indicated). Although the United States has
generally been opposed to diplomatic asylum, Cardinal Mindszenty has enjoyed asylum in the
American Embassy at Budapest since November 1956; see also, Miao case cited below.
Territorial asylum has been granted in the United States in recent years to such people as
Miao Chen-pai, press attache of the Embassy of the People's Republic of China at Damascus,
who first found asylum in the American Embassy in that city, ibid., Aug. 31, 1966, 6:2;
Svetlana Alliluyeva, daughter of Joseph Stalin, who defected in New Delhi and was assisted by
American officials to Europe, thence to the United States, ibid., Mar. 11, 1967, 1:2, Mar. 15,
22:3, Mar. 23, 14:3, Apr. 22, 1:3, 10:2 (late city ed.); Janos Radvanyi, charge d'affaires of the
Embassy of Hungary at Washington, ibid., May 18, 1967, 1:2 Lt. Col. C. Y. Runge, a Soviet
intelligence officer working in West Germany, ibid., Oct. 17, 1967, 15:1; Major General Jan
Sejna, a Czech Communist Party official, who is reported to have received asylum in the United
States in February 1968, ibid., Mar. 8, 1968, 1:6.
Among large scale grants of territorial asylum in the United States, the Cuban Refugee
Program is of continuing significance. From January 1, 1961, to January 1, 1968, 271,470
persons have entered the United States, from Cuba. While most of these people have come by
air, 9,992 have risked the trip in small boats. Cuban Refugee Center, Miami, Fla., Resettlement
Re.cap, Jan. 1968.
4 The state's control over aliens is".., an accepted maxim of international law." Ekiu v.
United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892). Congress has "...
plenary power over aliens ......
Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 222 (1961).
5 Sections 201, 203, Immigration and Nationality Act, 1952, 66 Stat. 163, 175,
178
(1952); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151, 1153; as amended by §§ 1, 3, 79 Stat. 911,912 (1965).
6 A limit of 120,000 is set on this category. Section 101(a)(27),
66 Stat. 169; 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(27); as amended by § 8, 79 Stat. 916 (1965). This category also includes returning
resident aliens, claimants to reacquisition of American citizenship, ministers of religious
denominations, and alien employees of the United States Government.
The Select Commission on Western Hemisphere Immigration, appointed by the President
pursuant to § 21, ibid., 920, has recently recommended a year's delay in the enforcement of
this ceiling. The Commission suggested an annual limitation of 40,000 immigrants from any one
Western Hemisphere country per year within the 120,000 maximum. The Commission also
recommended that where Cuban refugees entering by air change their status to permanent
residents, such changes should not be deducted from the 120,000 maximum figure. New York
7mes, Feb. 24, 1968, 2:7.
7 Sections 101(a)(15), 214, 66 Stat. 167, 189; 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(15), 1184.
8 A limit of 10,200 persons per annum is set on this category. Section 203(a)(7), 79 Stat.
913; 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7). The Attorney General must report to Congress twice a year on the
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discretion of the Attorney General ". . . For emergent reasons or for
reasons deemed strictly in the public interest ....-I Quota immigrants

and special immigrants are admitted for permanent residence. Aliens
who enter on conditional entry or on parole are not considered to be
"admitted" into the United States but are subject to exclusion. If such
an alien is found to be eligible for an immigration visa, however, he may
apply for adjustment of status to permanent resident without leaving
the United States, but such change in status will be charged to the visa
quota for his classification for that year." The political refugee who
has been admitted into the country and is then found to be a
deportable alien may request temporary withholding of deportation on
the plea that he would be subject to persecution on account of race,
religion, or political opinion in the country to which he is to be
deported,' 1 or suspension of deportation and adjustment of status to
permanent resident.' 2
The present study treats sixteen years of practice of territorial
asylum under Section 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
of 1952, as amended, and two years of practice under Section
203(a)(7), which was added to the Act in 1965. The purpose of the
study is to determine the extent to which territorial asylum in the
United States is a possibility under these two sections of the
immigration law and to examine the legal problems which have arisen
under these sections. In the study the term "exclusion" will be applied
to the situation in which an alien is either denied admission into the
country or is allowed to enter the country under special conditions but
is not regarded as "admitted" into the country. The term "expulsion"
will be applied to the situation in which an alien is found to be illegally
persons who have entered in this category during the previous six months. Section 203(0, ibid.
914; 8 U.S.C. § 1153(0.
9 Section 212(d)(5), 66 Stat. 188; 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5).
10 Sections 203(g), 203(a)(7), 245(b)(c), 79 Stat. 913-14, 918; 8 U.S.C. §§ 1153(g),
1153(a)(7), 1255(b)(c). A person who has entered conditionally is not debarred from
adjustment to permanent resident by reason of his not having the documents required for
admission, such as a valid unexpired passport and immigration visa. Section 212(a)(20), 66 Stat.
183; 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(20); § 203(h), 79 Stat. 914-15; 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h). For abuse of the
adjustment of status process by non-immigrant aliens, see Garcia-Castillo v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service, 350 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1965). For a summary of the effect of the 1965
amendments on the 1952 Act, see 1.Appleman, That New Immigration Act, 52 A.B.A.J. 717
(1966).
11 Section 243(h), 66 Stat. 214; 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h), as amended by § 1 1(f), 79 Stat. 918.
12 Section 244, 66 Stat. 214; 8 U.S.C. § 1254. Discretionary action by the Attorney
General under this section must have Congressional assent. The number of non-preference
immigration visas will be reduced by the number of such suspensions unless the aliens in
question are special immigrants or have immediate relatives in the United States. Section
244(d), 66 Stat. 216; 8 U.S.C. § 1254(d); as amended by § 12, 79 Stat. 916.
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in the country. Where "deportation" is used, it will apply to the
expulsion of aliens.
A. 1798-1948

The Alien Act of 1798 was the first law adopted by the United
States for the purpose of controlling immigration. It authorized the
President to expel aliens ".

.

. dangerous to the peace and safety of the

United States."'' This Act expired in 1800. No further legislation
relative to the control of immigration was passed by Congress until
1875.' Beginning in 1819 and up to 1855, however, several laws
designed to establish humane standards of treatment on immigration
ships were passed by Congress. At the same time, there began to emerge
a trend in feeling against unrestricted immigration, including attempts
by states to control it. These state laws were held by the Supreme
Court to be unconstitutional because they infringed upon the Federal
Government's exclusive power to regulate foreign commerce, but they
presaged later developments along this line.' s After 1875, legislation
designed at first to establish qualitative, and later, quantitative
limitations upon immigration became more frequent and increasingly
more restrictive, culminating in the adoption of the national origins
quota system in 1924, which was only eliminated in 1965.
Beginning with the Act of 1875, the immigration laws have
usually taken some cognizance of the plight of political refugees. The
Acts of 1875, 1882, and 1891, excepted a person convicted of a political
offense from exclusion as a criminal.' 6 Congressional reaction to the
assassination of President McKinley by an avowed anarchist was
manifested in the 1903 Immigration Act which added anarchists to the
The
classes of persons excluded from entry into the country.'
proposal of a literacy test as a means of selection, hence of limitation,
of immigration was debated for two decades and vetoed by three
Presidents before being introduced into the 1917 Immigration Act. This
13 Section 1, 1 Stat. 570, 571.
14 The

"coolie trade"

was prohibited in 1862, but this did not affect voluntary

immigration. 12 Stat. 340.
15 E.g., Smith v. Turner (The Passenger Cases), 48 U.S. 283 (1849).
16 Section 5, 18 Stat. 477 (1875); § 4, 22 Stat. 214 (1882); § 1, 26 Stat. 1084 (1891).
The exclusion of Chinese nationals also began in 1882. 22 Stat. 58.
17 Sections 2, 38, 32 Stat. 1213. This provision, greatly expanded in later yesrs, appears in
current immigration legislation as § 212(a)(28)(A), 66 Stat. 184; 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28)(A).
The 1961 Extradition Treaty with Brizil appears to be the only one to which the United States
is now party which specifically excludes anarchism from the category of political offenses. Art.
V(6)(b), T.I.A.S. 5691.
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provision did, however, exempt from exclusion a person seeking asylum
because of religious persecution." The Act made it plain that the
burden of proof as to such persecution was on the alien, and it was so
interpreted by the courts.' I The political offender was also recognized
in the Act which provided: "That nothing in this Act shall exclude, if
otherwise admissible, persons convicted, or who admit the commission,
or who teach or advocate the commission, of an offense purely
political." 2
Some mitigation of the increasing stringency of the
immigration laws was afforded the excluded alien by authorization in
the Act for temporary admission of such an alien into the country and
by the administrative device of "parole," an informal and discretionary
means of permitting an excluded alien to remain temporarily in this
country in the "custody" of a private agency concerned with assistance
to immigrants. 2' "Fashioned by administration ingenuity," parole was
especially useful as a means of enabling refugees to enter the
country.2 2 The "national origins" quota system establishing quantitative limitations upon immigration based upon geographical selection
was adumbrated in the 1921 Act, spelled out in the 1924 Act, and went
into effect in 1929.213 No special provision was made for political
refugees in any of these Acts.
18

Section 3, 39 Stat. 874, 877.

19 Ibid. E.g. United States ex rel. Ghersin v. Commissioner of Immigration, 288 F. 756 (2d

Cir. 1923); United States ex rel. Azizian v. Curran, 12 F.2d 502 (1926). Cf Matter of B, in
which the Board of Special Inquiry of the Immigration and Naturalization Service admitted an
alien of Jewish belief who had been excluded on grounds of conviction of fraud, a crime
involving moral turpitude. The Board took the position that this charge was probably part of
the discriminatory policy practiced in Nazi Germany against Jews, and consequently, that the
alien came within the purview of § 3, of the 1917 Act. 1 ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS
UNDER IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAWS 47 (1941) (cited henceforth as I. & N.
Dec.) Cf 39 Op. Att'y. Gen. 215, 226 (1938)(recommending that the Department of State
grant an immigration visa to a German alien who had been convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude (false statement concerning possession of property) which in the circumstances of
repressive Nazi control over persons of Jewish belief constituted a "political offense" within the
exception of § 3, of the 1917 Act.)
20 Section 3, 39 Stat. 877. For an interpretation of this provision, see Matter of K, 4 1. &
N. Dec. 108 (1950), at p. 11 below.
21 Section 3, 39 Stat. 878. See Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228 (1925).
22 1 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE, § 2.54
(1962, rev 'd. 1966) (cited henceforth as Gordon & Rosenfield). See, Matter of R, 3 I. & N. Dec.
45 (1947). Parole was formally incorporated into the immigration laws in 1952. Section
212(d)(5), 66 Stat. 188 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5).
23 42 Stat. 5; 43 Stat. 153; 45 Stat. 400 (1928). Administrative discretion was recognized
in the 1924 Act to the extent of allowing the Secretary of Labor (then in charge of immigration
matters) to admit an otherwise admissible alien who had left his place of departure on an
erroneous visa, and the adjustment to permanent residence of a minor who had been admitted
conditionally and one of whose parents was an American citizen. Sections 13(d), 14, 43 Stat.
153, 162.
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The first provision for expulsion of aliens after the 1798 law was
adopted ninety years later and authorized the deportation within one
year after entry of any alien who entered the country in violation of
the labor contract laws? 4 Six decades later this provision had
expanded to liability to expulsion at any time after entry for a variety
of causes, e.g. illegal entry, membership before or after entry of a
politically proscribed group, or conviction after entry of a crime
involving moral turpitude.2 S Prior to 1940, expulsion was mandatory,
with no exceptions in the immigration laws for the political refugee.
Recourse to a private bill in Congress was one form of possible relief.
Administrative practice again mitigated some of the harshness of these
laws as far as the refugee was concerned by allowing an alien to depart
voluntarily at his own expense to the country of his choice, by
"stretching facts," and by staying deportation temporarily.2 6 The
courts were reluctant, however, to review administrative decisions
regarding deportation, e.g. the contention that it was an abuse of
discretion to deport an avowed, anti-Fascist to Fascist Italy where he
would be subjected to severe penalties for his political beliefs.2 7 To the
argument that a deportable alien, a member of the Communist Party of
the United States, might be "maltreated" in the state of destination, a
District Court judge replied that ". . .if the danger exist, I do not
believe the court has power to relieve it. ' 2 In any event the alien,
refugee or otherwise, was not the subject of primary concern. Where an
24 Stat. 566 (1888).

25 Section 241(a), 66 Stat. 204; 8 U.S.C. § 125 1(a).
26 National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, Report on the Enforcement
of the Deportation Laws of the United States, 102-104 (1931) (cited henceforth as Wickersham
Report). See, § 1(b), 45 Stat. 1551 (1929). Cf United States ex rel. Karamian v. Curran, 16
F.2d 958 (2d Cir. 1927), (drawing the attention of the Secretary of Labor to the potential
personal danger to an alien of deportation to Iran.)
27 United States ex rel. Giletti v. Commissioner of Immigration, 35 F.2d 687 (2d Cir.
1929). Judge Learned Hand said obiter: "The occasion would therefore seem to be one in
which the utmost latitude might properly be given him, consonant with law, to escape these
consequences." Ibid., 689. See also, United States ex rel. Hudak v. Uhl, 20 F.Supp. 928
(N.D.N.Y. 1937), aff'd per curiam 96 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1938): Ex parte Panagopoulos, 3
F.Supp. 222 (S.D.Cal. 1933).
28 United States ex rel. Fortmueller v. Commissioner of Immigration, 14 F.Supp. 484, 488
(S.D.N.Y. 1936). Cf United States ex rel. Weinberg v. Scholtfeldt, 26 F.Supp. 283 (N.D.lII.
1938), in which a habeas corpus petition was granted to a seaman of Jewish parentage, born in
that part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire which had become Czechoslovakia, who pleaded that
Jews were being persecuted in Central Europe. The Court said: "I do not believe that the
immigration laws contemplate any such strict compliance with the letter thereof, as would
oblige the court to return at this time a jew to a country where his property would be
confiscated, where his life might be in jeopardy, and from which, if he were permitted to enter
it at all, he would be forced immediately to flee." Ibid., 284. This judgment was held to be
"clearly erroneous" in Soewapadji v. Wixon, 290, cited note 2.
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Italian communist, who was a deportable alien, offered to go to Soviet
Russia at his own expense and showed that he had permission to enter
that country, the Board of Review insisted upon his deportation to Italy
apparently as a punitive measure: "The law under which the proceedings were taken is in existence for the protection and welfare of the
United States, and in our judgment that welfare and protection is best
secured by the alien's deportation to Italy." 2 9 In 1931 the Wickersham
Commission did recommend inclusion of the option of voluntary
departure in the immigration laws as well as provision for suspension of
deportation in certain cases.3 0 These recommendations were incorporated into the Alien Registration Act of 1940.
With the advent of the Second World War, considerations of
national security and humanitarianism conflicted in United States
policy toward refugees. The Alien Registration Act of 1940 strengthened the provisions of the immigration laws regarding "anarchistic and
similar classes" by making such membership "at any time" before or
after entry into the United States grounds for exclusion or expulsion.3 1
The Attorney General was authorized to permit a deportable alien
"... who has proved good moral character for the preceding five years"
to leave voluntarily, or he might suspend the deportation of said alien
"... if not racially inadmissible or ineligible to naturalization in the
United States if he [the Attorney General] finds such deportation
would result in serious economic detriment to a citizen or legally
resident alien who is the spouse, parent, or minor child of such
deportable alien." 3 2 An order for suspension of deportation under
these circumstances for longer than six months required the approval of
Congress. 3 3 This provision could be used to provide relief for the
political refugee.
The 1924 Immigration Act was also modified so that a diplomat,
or a member of his family, who chose for political reasons not to return
29 Serio Case, Wickersham Report, 122. The case was before the District Court in New
York on a petition for habeas corpus which was denied following this decision. For the
permissive character of a grant of voluntary departure under the 1917 and 1924 Acts, see,
United States ex rel. Ciannamea v. Neelly, 202 F.2d 289 (7th Cir. 1952).
30 Wickersham Report, 179.
31 Section 23(1), 54 Stat. 670, 673. Congress eliminated
the five-year statute of limitations
on the commencement of deportation proceedings against such persons following the Supreme
Court's decision in Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U.S. 22 (, 939), holding that the 1918 Act reached
subversive aliens only if they were shown to be members of politically proscribed organizations
at the time such proceedings were commenced.
32 Section 20(c), 54 Stat. 670, 672.
33 Ibid. If the alien were a quota immigrant, the quota for his country was
reduced
accordingly. Suspension of deportation was not available to aliens proscribed for political,
health, or moral reasons. Section 20(d), ibid., 672-73.
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to his state of origin would no longer be subject to immediate
deportation upon relinquishment of his classification as a "nonimmigrant alien" but could remain in the United States, subject to the
approval of the Secretary of State.3 4 The Neutrality Act of 1939 was
amended to permit American vessels to enter war zones or combat areas
to assist in the evacuation of refugee children under sixteen years of
age. 3 That mandatory explusion under the 1917 Act was obviously
impeded by wartime conditions was recognized in 1943, when the 1917
Act was amended so as to permit the Attorney General to exercise a
choice as to the proposed destination of the deportable alien, i.e.; by
returning a national of a government in exile to the state in which that
government was then located, provided that such state was willing to
accept the alien, or, if the government were not in exile, to an adjacent
country, or to any country which was acceptable to the alien's
government.3 6
B. 1948- 1968
The United States took cognizance of the massive numbers of
refugees and displaced persons who were routed from their former
residences by the effects of the Second World War and subsequent
political upheavals in Europe, the Near East, the Far East, and Latin
America, by admitting some 1,200,000 persons in these categories into
the country between 1945 and 1967. These people came into the
country mainly on the basis of special legislation which made
exceptions to the quota system and to other conditions established in
the various immigration laws. 3 The process of large-scale admission of
refugees into the country was initiated by President Truman who issued
a directive on December 22, 1945, authorizing the rapid utilization by
European refugees, displaced persons, and orphans of unfilled immigra34 54 Stat. 711.
35 54 Stat. 4 (1939); 54 Stat. 866 (1940). A German stowaway who had deserted a
German ship interned in Curacao contended without success that deportation to Curacao would
be a violation of the Neutrality Act of 1935, as amended, and that he would be subjected to
possible capture by British or French naval vessels en route to Curacao or else be
court-martialed if he were deported to Germany. The Court, noting that Curacao was not in the
"forbidden zone," dismissed his petition for habeas corpus. United States ex rel. Koentje v.
Reimer, 30 F.Supp. 440 (S.D.N.Y. 1939). 49 Stat. 1081 (1935); 50 Stat. 121 (1937).
36 57 Stat. 553. See, Glikas v. Tomlinson, 49 F.Supp. 104 (N.D.
Ohio 1943), concerning
deportation of Greek seaman, who had deserted his ship in the United States, to the United
Kingdom pursuant to an "understanding" among the United States, the United Kingdom, and
the Greek Government in Exile in the United Kingdom. See also, Moraitis v. Delaney, 46
F.Supp. 425 (D.Md. 1942), modified other grounds, 136 F.2d 129 (4th Cir. 1943).
37 For a summary of this legislation up to 1965, see 52 Dep't. State Bull. 471 (1965).
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tion quotas for that area and the facilitation of travel arrangements for
them to come to the United States. 3 8 The Displaced Persons Act of
1948 provided for the issuance of 202,000 visas outside the quota limit
for two years to persons found on January 1, 1948, in Italy or in the
American, British, or French occupied zones of Germany and Austria,
including persons who had entered these countries because of the
circumstances of war, as well as Austrian or German residents who had
fled Nazi persecution but had subsequently returned to one of these
countries because of wartime conditions; and as a third group, Czech
nationals who had fled their country after 1948, "as a direct result of
persecution or fear of persecution" and who were to be found in one of
the above occupied zones. 3 9 Priority for visas was given to persons who
had fought against "the enemies of the United States" in the Second
World War and who were ".

.

. unable or unwilling to return to the

countries of which they are nationals because of persecution or fear of
persecution on account of race, religion or political opinions." 4 0
Section 4 of the Act extended to any displaced person who had already
entered the United States the possibility of adjusting his status to that
of permanent resident, provided that he could show that his departure
from his state of origin, nationality, or last residence was occasioned by
the war and that he could not return thereto because of ". . .persecution or fear of persecution on account of race, religion or political
opinions."4 The formula was strictly interpreted, e.g. in Lavdas v.
Holland, it was held that this section of the Act could not be invoked as
a bar to deportation to Greece on grounds that the alien feared political
reprisals from Communist elements in that country. 4 2 In 1950 the
duration of the Displaced Persons Act was extended for two years; and
the definition of "eligible displaced person" was broadened to include
persons who had fled into the Allied occupation zones from their own
38

13 Dep't. State Bull. 981-84 (1945).

39 Section 2(c)(d), 62 Stat. 1009. Such "eligible displaced persons" had to meet
the

qualifications of the immigration laws for persons admitted to permanent residence in the
United States and had to give assurances that they would not become public charges.
40 Section 7, ibid. Second priority went to displaced persons who on January 1, 1948,
were living in displaced persons camps and centers.
41 Section 4, ibid. Such adjustment required Congressional approval. If the alien were a
quota immigrant at the time of entry, the quota for the country of such alien was reduced
accordingly. This was ". . . a system which mortgaged the quotas for their countries far into
the future." 1 Gordon & Rosenfield, § 1.2.
42 139 F.Supp. 514 (E.D.Pa. 1955). A Polish national who had concealed the fact that he
had been forced to adopt German nationality in 1940, but who had continued to regard himself
as Polish, was not considered to have misrepresented his origin under the terms of the 1948
Act. Matter of Z, 5 I. & N. Dec. 323 (1953).
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countries since the beginning of 1946, and who feared to return to
these countries ".

.

. because of persecution or fear of persecution on

account of race, religion, or political opinions." 4" Issuance of an
additional 39,000 visas above quota limits was authorized by this Act
which also set aside a certain number of these visas for displaced
orphans, former residents of Yugoslav-controlled Venezia Giulia, China,
and Greece, and for persons who had served in the Polish armed forces
during the Second World War. 4 4
Half a decade after the Second World War, humanitarian concern
for refugees was balanced by popular reaction to the "Cold War." The
provision in the immigration laws for the exclusion of avowed members
of anarchist organizations was further qualified in 1948, to include
aliens "... . who the Attorney General knows or has reason to believe

seek to enter the United States for the purpose of engaging in activities
which will endanger the public safety of the United States." 4 The
1948 Displaced Persons Act had forbidden the issuance of visas to
persons who had been associated with movements ".

.

. hostile to the

United States or the form of government of the United States."4 6 This
provision was strengthened in 1950 by the following amendment:
No visas shall be issued under the provisions of this Act, as
amended, to any person who is or has been a member of the
Communist Party, or to any person who adheres to, advocates, or
follows, or who has adhered to, advocated, or followed, the principles
of any political or economic system or philosophy directed toward the
destruction of free competitive enterprise and the revolutionary
overthrow of representative governments, or to any person who is or
has been a member of any organization which has been designated by
the Attorney General of the United States as a Communist organization, or to any person who is or has been a member of or participated
in any movement which is or has been hostile to the United States or
the form of government of the United States, or to any person who
advocated or assisted in the persecution of any person because of race,
religion, or national origin, or to any person who has voluntarily borne
arms against the United States during World War

11.41

43 Section 2, 64 Stat. 219.
44 Sections 3, 4, ibid., 220-223. The Act was amended in
1951, but the number of
non-quota visas was not increased. 65 Stat. 96. The terminal date of the 1948 Act was extended
from June to November 1952, in order to permit the admission of 386 persons from the Baltic
states and Soviet Russia who had fled to Sweden and thence by small boats to the United States
between 1945 and 1950. Annual Report of the Immigration and Naturalization Service 1953,
37 (cited henceforth as INS ANN. REP).
45 62 Stat. 268 (1948).
46 Section 13, 62 Stat. 1009, 1014.
47 Section 11, 64 Stat. 227, amending the 1918 Act. Persons under eighteen years of
age
were not required to make any disclaimers under this section.
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But recognition of involuntary membership in such politically offensive
organizations or movements as a fact of life in authoritarian states led
to a modification of the stringency of this type of exclusionary rule in
195 1. The reach of the 1918 Act which had spelled out the
exclusionary provision of the 1917 Act relative to such membership
was now limited to "voluntary" membership or affiliation which would
not include ". . . membership or affiliation which is or was solely (a)
when under sixteen years of age, (b) by operation of law, or (c) for

purposes of obtaining employment, food rations, or other essentials of
living, and where necessary for such purposes."" 8

The Internal Security Act of 1950'9 was not directed to the relief
of political refugees seeking asylum in the United States; however, its
modification of certain provisions of the 1917 Act reflected some
awareness on the part of Congress of the realities of their situation.
Although the House of Representatives' draft of the Internal Security
Act did not take cognizance of the political dangers to which a
deported refugee might be exposed, the Senate amended the draft as
follows: "No alien shall be deported under any provisions of this Act to
any country in which the Attorney General shall find that such alien
would be subjected to physical persecution."'
Under this provision
which appeared in the Act as passed by Congress, the burden of proof
of "physical persecution" was on the alien, and the decision as to the

validity of the plea was at the discretion of the Attorney General. s 1
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 s 2 constituted both
a revision and a codification of the immigration laws then in effect.
48

65 Stat. 28 (1951). Section 3, 39 Stat. 874, 875-876 (1917), 40 Stat. 1012 (1918).

49 64 Stat. 987. The Act was passed over a presidential veto. 96 Cong. Rec. 15629 (1950).

50 S. Rep. No. 2239, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 4, 10, amending § 20, 39 Stat. 890. See, H.R.
10, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950).
51 Section 23, 64 Stat. 1010. The Act also provided that where a deportable alien did not
choose a destination or the country of choice refused to accept him, the Attorney General had
discretionary choice as to the destination. See, Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 90 F.Supp. 397
(S.D.N.Y. 1950), 90 F.Supp. 431 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), aff'd. 87 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1951), aff'd.
342 U.S. 580 (1952), rehearing denied 343 U.S. 936 (1952). See, Sang Ryup Park v. Barber,
107 F.Supp. 603, 605 (N.D.Cal. 1952) (finding that alien would not be subject to physical
persecution if deported to South Korea was held to be arbitrary). See, United States ex rel.
Camezon v. District Director, 105 F.Supp. 32, 38 (S.D.N.Y. 1952): "It is apparent that the
amendment of Title 8 U.S.C.A. § 156 by § 23 of the Internal Security Act of 1950 was made
with the internal security of the nation in mind and not with any solicitude for the
objectionable alien's welfare." Cf. United States ex rel. Chen Ping Zee v. Shaughnessy, 107
F.Supp. 607 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). Section 23 applied only in expulsion cases. Ng Lin Chong v.
McGrath, 202 F.2d 316 (D.C.Cir. 1952).
52 66 Stat. 162. The operation of this Act with particular
reference to § 243(h) will be
discussed below. The Act was vetoed by President Truman.
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Retaining the national origins quota system, this Act was not designed
to encourage an influx of aliens, including political refugees, but it
contained several provisions relevant to the problem of refugeeism.
There were comprehensive provisions for exclusion on grounds of
unacceptable political affiliations or beliefs, personal health, dubious
social practices, or criminal record. But the 1951 Act's exception for
involuntary or youthful membership of organizations whose members
would ordinarily be excluded from admission was retained." 3 The
''purely political offense" was excepted from the category of crimes
involving moral turpitude.' ' As the definition of the "political
offense" in United States practice has followed the reasoning of the
Queen's Bench Division in Re Castioni,5 5 whereby such an offender
must be able to show his involvement in a political movement in order
to be able to plead successfully for relief under this exception, it
affords only limited protection to the political offender. The point was
made quite clearly by the Board of Immigration Appeals in a 1950 case
concerning an alien who had been convicted in 1927 in Poland on the
charge of killing the Soviet ambassador to Poland. Holding that the
alien was excludable on grounds of conviction for an offense involving
moral turpitude, the Board said: ".

.

. in order for an offense to

constitute a political one, there must be concerted action for a political
purpose."' 6 The alien's personal opposition to the Soviet Government
did not meet this definition of "political offense." ' I The 1952 Act also

authorized the Attorney General "in his discretion" to allow an alien
53 Section 212(a)(28)(I)(i), 66 Stat. 186; 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28)(1)(i). An alien found
inadmissible because of prior membership in a proscribed organization might be reclassified if
"... since the termination of such membership or affiliation, such alien is and has been, for at
least five years prior to the date of the application for a visa, actively opposed to the doctrine,
program, principles, and ideology of such party or organization or the section, subsidiary,
branch, or affiliate or subdivision thereof, and (b) the admission of such alien into the United
States would be in the public interest." Section 212(a) (28)(1)(ii)(a)(b), ibid.; 8 U.S.C. § 1182
(a)(28)(l)(ii)(a)(b). In 1966, 49 defectors were reported to Congress in pursuance of this
section. INS ANN. REP. 1966, 8.
54 Sections 212(a)(9)(10), 66 Stat. 182; 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(9)(10). For an example of
the use of § 212(a)(9), see E. LOEWENSTEIN, THE ALIEN AND THE IMMIGRATION LAW,
74-77 (1958). This section was amended in 1961 in order to eliminate from the category of
excludable offenses a misdemeanor classifiable as a petty offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1(2)(3).
Section 13, 75 Stat. 650, 655. A misdemeanor is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1 as a petty offense for
which the penalty does not exceed six months imprisonment, a fine of not more than $500, or
both.
ss [18911 1 Q.B. 149, 159. See, A. Evans, Reflections upon the Political Offense in
InternationalPractice,57 AM. J. INT'L. L. 1 (1963).
56 Matter of K, 118, cited note 20. The action arose under § 3
of the 1917 Act.
57 Cf Regina v. Governor of Brixton Prison, Ex parte Kolczynski, [1955] 1 Q.B. 540
(mutiny treated as political offense).
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who had applied for admission to enter the country temporarily
".... for emergent reasons or for reasons deemed strictly in the public

interest."' " Such "parole" did not constitute admission for purposes of
immigration but left the individual in the status of an excludable
alien." 9 Five years later this provision was used to give asylum to some

31,000 Hungarian refugees. 6 0
As far as the deportable alien was concerned, the 1952 Act
retained the possibility of the plea of physical persecution as a bar to
expulsion which had appeared in the Internal Security Act, but changed
the text so as to emphasize the discretionary nature of the Attorney
General's finding in the matter: "The Attorney General is authorized to
withhold deportation of any alien within the United States to any
country in which in his opinion the alien would be subject to physical
persecution and for such period of time as he deems to be necessary for
such reason."' 6 1 As this provision was later held to be available to alien
crewmen, despite the fact that the Act did not so provide, as they are
subject to exclusion rather than to expulsion, the difficulty was
resolved by administrative regulation in 1961, which extended the
provision for parole to an alien crewman who feared to ".

.

. return to a

Communist, Communist-dominated, or Communist-occupied country
because of fear of persecution in that country on account of race,
religion, or political opinion. ' 6 2 The "right of diplomatic sanctuary,"
provided in the 1940 Act for the foreign diplomat who chose to
dissociate himself from his mission, presumably for political reasons,
63
was retained in the 1952 Act.
Section 212(d)(5), 66 Stat. 188; 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (d)(5). 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b).
For a brief discussion of the use of parole before 1952, see, Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357
U.S. 185, 188-89 (1958). The parole of aliens who are excludable for political reasons or
because of their previous criminal records has to be reported to Congress. Section 212(d)(6), 66
Stat. 188; 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(6).
60 See, Report by the President's Committee for Hungarian Refugee Relief, May 14, 1957,
36 Dep't. State Bull. 984-85 (1957). By Presidential Order of December 1, 1956, reported to
Congress in the President's Message of January 13, 1957, 15,000 Hungarian refugees were
admitted under § 212(d)(5). 103 Cong. Rec. 1355 (1957). They were admitted to permanent
residence in 1958. 72 Stat. 419 (1958). In the same month, a law was enacted permitting the
cancellation of departure bonds given by refugees who had been granted permanent resident
status. 72 Stat. 375 (1958).
61 Section 243(h), 66 Stat. 214; 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (emphasis supplied).
62 United States ex rel. Szlajmer v. Esperdy, 188 F.Supp. 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), holding
58

59

that crewmen had access to this plea where the Act contained no other opportunity for a plea
of physical persecution if the seaman were returned to his ship and thence to the home state.
See, § 252, 66 Stat. 221; 8 U.S.C. § 1282. See Leng May Ma v. Barber, cited note 59. See, 8
C.F.R. § 253.1(0. See note 99.
63 Section 241(e), 66 Stat. 208; 8 U.S.C. § 1251(e). Deportation in this situation requires
the approval of the Secretary of State unless the ex-diplomat comes within the class of person
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As the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 reached only a limited
group of persons affected by post-war political and economic upheavals
and the condition of these people continued to be pressing not only in
Europe but also in the Far East, another exception was made to the
quota system in the form of 205,000 special non-quota visas allotted
under the Refugee Relief Act of 1953 to three classes of persons: the
"refugee," defined as a person in a non-communist country who was
unable to return to his homeland because of "persecution, fear of
persecution, natural calamity or military operations . . .;" the "es-

capee," who had fled a communist-controlled country because of
"persecution or fear of persecution on account of race, religion, or
political opinion;" and the "German expellee," defined as a person who
had fled or had been compelled to leave a country in Eastern Europe
because of his German ethnic origin. 6" The Act also provided for
adjustment of status, subject to Congressional approval, of a limited
number of aliens in one of the above classifications who had lawfully
entered the United States and who, as in the 1948 Act, could prove
that they were unable to return to their countries of birth, nationality,
or last residence "for fear of persecution on account of race, religion, or
political opinion." 6 s There was some question in the courts as to
whether the listing of the country of birth, nationality, or last residence
was conjunctive or disjunctive. The Immigration and Naturalization
Service took the view that the listing was conjunctive, so that the alien
had to prove himself unable to return to any of the three for fear of
persecution. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit saw the list as
disjunctive; however, the Court chose to follow the Service's interpretation, but not to the point of denying relief to an alien of Chinese origin
who feared persecution if returned to China but who was unable for
reasons other than persecution to return to Singapore, his last place of
residence. 6 6 In a similar case the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit warned that ".

.

. a blind literalism [in interpreting the Act]

leads to absurd results that would negate, in worthy cases, the very
who is liable to deportation for reasons of "public safety or security." Sections 241(a)(6)(7),

66 Stat. 205, 206; 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251 (a)(6)(7). The expression, "right of diplomatic
sanctuary," was employed by the House Committee on the Judiciary in its
proposed 1952 Act. H.R. Rep. No. 1365, 82nd Cong., 2d Sess., 61 (1952).
64 Section 2, 67 Stat. 400. The Act admitted refugees "outside the
limitations," unlike the 1948 Act.
65 Section 6, ibid., 403. For the distinction between § 6 and
§ 243(h) of
see Cha'o Li Chi v. Murff, 250 F.2d 854, 858 (2d Cir. 1957).
66 Cheng Lee King v. Carnahan, 160 F.Supp. 721 (N.D.Cal. 1956), rev'd.

report on the
normal quota
the 1952 Act,
and remanded

253 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1958). This decision was followed in Lubini v. Brownell, 251 F.2d 28
(D.C.Cir. 1958), cert. denied 356 U.S. 966 (1958).
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purposes which the Act was adopted to accomplish;" the Court held
that the Act should be interpreted so as to carry out the "liberal
remedial purpose" of Congress in adopting such legislation.6 7 In
proceedings under the Act, the burden of proof as to fear of
persecution was on the alien who had to show a "rational basis" for any
such plea. 6 For example, an individual's condition of statelessness
arising from succession of states in Palestine did not suffice to establish
a basis for such fear; nor, as in Lavdas, would fear of political reprisals
from Communist elements in Greece, in this case, come within the
purview of the Act. 6 9
Final relief under the 1953 Act, as with the 1948 Act, came
through the passage of a concurrent resolution by Congress allowing the
alien to remain in the United States. Such relief, however, was by no
means automatic. In Cheng Fu Sheng v. Barber, the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit said: "Since the test [of fear of persecution] is
essentially a subjective one it is satisfied by a determination that the
alien's claim has a seed of reality and is asserted in good faith."' 7 The
Court was satisfied that testimony on behalf of plaintiffs established
that they had good grounds to fear returning to Taiwan and directed
that plaintiffs be granted relief under Section 6. This relief was denied,
however, by the House of Representatives, and in subsequent litigation,
concerned with the question of whether Taiwan constituted a
"country" to which a person might be deported under the Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952, it was held that plaintiffs should be
deported to Taiwan.7" The 1953 Act was amended in 1954, to include
persons brought into the United States during the Second World War
from Latin America for internment among those unable to return to
their place of origin for fear of persecution. 7 2
The provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,
making acquisition of an immigrant visa by fraud or misrepresentation
67 Leong Leun Do v. Esperdy, 309 F.2d 467, 473 (2d Cir. 1962), reversing and remanding
197 F.Supp. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
68 Mascarin v. Holland, 143 F.Supp. 427, 428 (E.D.Pa. 1956).
69 Bajalieh v. Beechie, 309 F.2d 386 (9th Cir. 1962); D'Antonio v. Shaughnessy, 139

F.Supp. 719 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
70 269 F.2d 497, 500 (9th Cir. 1959),reversing 144 F.Supp. 913 (N.D.Cal. 1956).
71 H.R. Rep. No. 1176, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 2-3 (1959). H.Res. 384 (Sept. 11, 1959)
disapproving permanent residence for plaintiffs, 105 Cong. Rec. 19, 122 (1959). Cheng Fu
Sheng v. Rogers, 177 F.Supp. 281 (D.D.C. 1959) (denying deportation), reversed 280 F.2d 663
(D.C.Cir. 1960), cert. denied 364 U.S. 891 (1960), 294 F.2d 262 (D.C.Cir. 1961).
72 Section 3, 68 Stat. 1044. E.g., United States ex rel. Von Kleczkowski v. Watkins, 71
F.Supp. 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1947)(concerning 1917 Act).
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ground for deportation as an excluded alien, was modified in 1957 as to

refugee-escapees who were admitted into the country between 1945
and 1954, where the offender could ".

.

. establish to the satisfaction of

the Attorney General that the misrepresentation was predicated upon
the alien's fear of persecution because of race, religion, or political
opinion if repatriated to his former home or residence, . . ."' This Act
defined "refugee-escapee" in geographical terms as a person from a
communist-controlled area or country in the Middle East, a region
extending from Libya to Pakistan and from Turkey to Ethiopia. 7 4 In
1958, the issuance of nonquota visas to displaced persons from the
Azores and Indonesia was authorized. 7 S The "Fair Share" Act of 1960

authorized the Attorney General to parole refugee-escapees, as defined
in the 1957 Act, into the United States provided that at the time of
their application for parole they were living as aliens in a non-

communist area and were within the mandate of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees. 7

6

This Act, which was extended

indefinitely in 1962," was terminated in 1965, by the incorporation
of its provisions into the revised Immigration and Nationality Act. In
1962, a number of Chinese refugees was admitted into the United
States from Hong Kong under parole in an effort to relieve some of the
pressure on the Crown Colony from refugees fleeing the Chinese
mainland. 7 '

Political oppression following the coming into power of

the Castro regime has brought a heavy influx of refugees from Cuba.
They

are in the country in various categories-as immigrants, as

73 Section 7, 71 Stat. 639, 640-41 (1957), amending § 241(c), 66 Stat. 208; 8 U.S.C.
§
1251(c). See, Matter of C-T-P-, Department of Justice, Interim Decisions of the Board of
Immigration Appeals, No. 953 (1958)(cited henceforth as Int. Dec. No.)(disregarding
misrepresentations as to parentage and previous residence in visa application). Cf. Matter of L,
Int. Dec. No. 852 (1957)(ordering deportation of stateless person who misrepresented previous
residence in visa application).

The Act also ended the "quota deductions" required by the Displaced Persons Act and
authorized the use of such nonquota visas as had not been used under the Refugee Relief Act
by German expellees, refugees of Dutch ethnic origin, and refugee-escapees as defined in the
1957 Act.
74 Section 15(c), 71 Stat. 639.
7" 72 Stat. 1712.
76 Section 1, 74 Stat. 504. The United States would accept up to 25% of the total number
of refugees being resettled under the Commissioner's auspices. As with the 1952 Act, grants of
parole had to be reported to Congress by the Attorney General. Section 2, ibid. It was possible
for the alien to apply for change of status to permanent resident after two years.
77 Section 6, 76 Stat. 121. The various programs for the resettlement and rehabilitation of
refugees were also codified by this Act.
78 Presidential Directive, May 23, 1962, 46 Dep't. State Bull. 993 (1962). Between
1962
and 1965, 15,111 Chinese refugees were paroled into the United States. Of this number, 9,126
were subsequently granted permanent residence. INS ANN. REP. 1966, 7.
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non-immigrants with waivers of their documentary requirements, under
parole, or under involuntary departure status.7 The Cuban Refugee
Act of 1966, provided for adjustment in status to permanent residents
of such refugees who have been admitted or paroled into the United
States.8 0
Dissatisfaction with the stringent and inequitable terms of the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 was expressed by Presidents
Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson. 8 Between 1962 and
1965, the Immigration Subcommittees of the House and Senate
Judiciary Committees examined the problem of control of immigration
under contemporary conditions.' 2 President Kennedy submitted a
"comprehensive program for revision" to Congress on July 23, 1963,
which was endorsed by President Johnson and enacted in substance in
1965.83
Two of the amendments made by Congress in 1965, to the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, reflected an awareness of the
plight of the refugee as a continuing problem in contemporary times
79 See note 3. Hearings on Migration and Refugee Assistance before Subcomm. No.
1 of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). United States-Cuba,
Agreement Regarding Movement of Cuban Refugees to the United States, 1965, T.I.A.S. 6063.
The status of "indefinite voluntary departure" can be withdrawn without a hearing as it is
granted as a matter of grace. Gomez-Fernandez v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 316
F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied 375 U.S. 942 (1963).
80 80 Stat. 1161. Cf. Matter of Alvarez-Riera, Int. Dec. No. 1705 (1967).
81 The President's Commission on Immigration and Naturalization, appointed by President
Truman in 1952 and headed by former Solicitor General Philip B. Perlman, severely criticized
the 1952 Act in its report entitled, Whom We Shall Welcome (1953). The Commission said with
regard to political asylum:
One of our national traditions is that we have provided asylum and haven to
the oppressed of other lands. This we were able to do until 1924 because our law
was flexible enough to meet such situations. Asylum for the oppressed is thwarted
by the national origins system ...
The United States is one of the few major democratic countries of the free
world whose present laws impede and frequently prevent providing asylum. Ibid.,
118.
President Eisenhower recommended changes in the Act upon a number of occasions,
e.g., H.R. Doc. No. 1, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 13 (1955); H.R. Doc. No. 1, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.,
13 (1961). President Kennedy expressed dissatisfaction with the Act in his book, A NATION
OF IMMIGRANTS, 77 ff. (rev. ed. 1964). President Johnson urged changes in the Act, e.g., 1
Public Papersof the Presidents,Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64, 123-24.
82 Subcomm. No. 1 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, Study of Population and
Immigration Problems, Sp. Ser. (1962-64), see nos. 10, 13, 14, and 16. See, interalia, Hearings
on H.R. 7700 before Subcomm. No. I of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d
Sess., 3 pts. (1964); Hearings on S. 500 before the Subcomm. on Immigration and
Naturalization of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 pts. (1965).
83 Letter to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House on-Revision of the
Immigration Laws, July 23, 1963, Public Papers of the Presidents, John F Kennedy, 1963,
594. 79 Stat. 911.
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rather than as a response to sporadic political upheavals. A quota of not
more than six per cent, of the total number of immigrants admissible
into the country each year (i.e. 10,200 out of 170,000) was reserved
for the "conditional

entry"

of aliens who

".

.

. (i)

because of

persecution or fear of persecution on account of race, religion, or
political opinion ...have fled (I) from any Communist or Communist-

dominated country or area, or (II) from any country within the general
area of the Middle East, and (ii) are unable or unwilling to return to
such country or area on account of race, religion, or political
opinion .... "' ' This provision was justified in the Report of the
House Committee on the Judiciary as restoring to the United States the
determination of who shall be classified as a refugee, a determination
left to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees according
to the 1960 "Fair Share" Act. Under the terms of the new provision,
the President can act rapidly to admit refugees into the country in the
face of emergency conditions; but Congress "... reserves the power to
review the case history of every refugee conditionally entered into the
United States to determine whether the interests of this country are
subject to outside pressure.

'

5

The second change in the 1952 Act affected the political refugee
as a deportable alien. The phrase, "persecution on account of race,
religion, or political opinion," was substituted for "physical persecution" in Section 243(h).8 6 Reflecting the wording of the 1948
Displaced Persons Act, the 1953 Refugee Relief Act, and the 1957
Refugee-Escapee Act, this phraseology recognized, as the House Report
put it, that "

. .

. [t] echniques of persecution are not limited to bodily

8
violence alone." 7
I1 Political Asylum under Section 203(a)(7)

Section 203 (a)(7) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952 as amended is designed to facilitate the entrance of the political
84

Section 203(a)(7)(A), 79 Stat. 913; 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7)(A). Conditional entries are

also available to "... persons uprooted by catastrophic natural calamity .... Section
203(a)(7) (B), ibid.; 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7)(B). A quota for refugees was established under the
"Fair Share" Act of 1960, § 2, 74 Stat. 504. "Conditional entry" was deemed to be a less
offensive term than "parole." S. Rep. No. 748, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 17 (1965). The provision
for parole, however, still remains in effect under the 1952 Act.
85 H.R. Rep. No. 745, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 15 (1965). "Fair Share" Act, 74 Stat. 504.
Section 203(0, 79 Stat. 915; 8 U.S.C. § 1153(f).
86 Section 11(f), 79 Stat. 918.
87 H.R. lgep. No. 745, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 22. Dissatisfaction with the Act as amended
continues. In a recent speech to the Chicago Conference on United States Immigration Policy,
Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) urged inter alia a statute of limitations on deportation
proceedings. Boston Globe, Feb. 23, 1968, 6:1.
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refugee into the United States through the use of the special
classification of "conditional entry." A person on conditional entry is
considered to be an excludable alien whose status can be adjusted to
that of permanent resident at the discretion of the Attorney General,
subject to the approval of Congress. Administrative refusal to make
such an adjustment of status is not open to appeal.8 8
A. Exclusion Procedure
Although exclusion proceedings are somewhat more summary
than expulsion proceedings, the alien has some opportunity to protect
his interests. A hearing on the order to exclude will be held before a
Special Inquiry Officer of the Immigration and Naturalization Service
who is not the officer who investigated the case.' 9 In this proceeding,
the alien may be represented by counsel. If the Special Inquiry Officer
so desires, the government may be represented by a trial attorney, so
that the elements of a judicial proceeding are possible. 9 The alien,
who has the option of an open hearing, may present evidence on his
own behalf including depositions, examine the Government's evidence,
and cross-examine the Government's witnesses. 9 If found excludable,
the alien is immediately deportable. 9 2 An appeal against an adverse
decision can be taken to the Board of Immigration Appeals.9 The
Special Inquiry Officer may certify his decision to the Board for review
if it presents a novel issue, or the case may be appealed by the
Commissioner of Immigration or his subordinates.9" An exclusion
order which is not final may be reviewed by a District Court in a
declaratory judgment proceeding. 9" A final order for exclusion is
9
reviewable through habeas corpus proceedings. 6
8 8 C.F.R. § 245.4. Only the District Director of immigration is authorized to classify an
alien as a refugee under § 203(a)(7). Matter of Garcia-Meijides, Int. Dec. No. 1696 (1967).
89 Section 236(a), 66 Stat. 200; 8 U.S.C. §
122 6(a). 8 C.F.R. § 236.2. Expulsion
procedure is described at p. 20 ff. below.
90 8 C.F.R. § 236.2(c), as amended by 32 Fed. Reg. 9628 (1967). A trial attorney
will be
used if nationality is at issue.
9' 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.2(a)(b), 242.14(e).
92 Sections 236(c), 237(a), 66 Stat. 200, 201; 8 U.S.C. §§ 1266(c), 1227(a).
93 Section 236(b), 66 Stat. 200; 8 U.S.C. § 1226(b). 8 C.F.R. § 236.5. Appeals
are subject
to the limitations provided in § 236(d), 66 Stat. 200; 8 U.S.C. § 1226(d) (exclusion on
medical grounds).
94 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.4, 103.4. The District Director may appeal an order by the
Special
Inquiry Officer admitting an alien into the country. Section 236.5(c), ibid.
95 Section 106(c); 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c), as amended by 75 Stat. 653 (1961); 5 U.S.C.
§
1009.
96 Section 5(b), 75 Stat. 653.
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 3, No. 2

The PoliticalRefugee

223

An alien crewman who has been denied a conditional landing
permit or whose landing permit has been revoked is treated as an
excludable alien.9 He may be summarily returned to his ship, or the
decision as to his status may be determined at an interview with the
local District Director of Immigration. In this proceeding the crewman
may not take advantage of all of the procedural safeguards established
for exclusionary hearings. He may not be confronted with adverse
information. He has no right to counsel; in general, he does not have a
right of cross-examination nor to request subpoenas. 9 But by reason
of his presence in an American port, an alien crewman is in a
particularly fortuitous position to try to obtain political asylum. If he
can establish in the interview that " . . . he cannot return to a
Communist, Communist-dominated, or Communist-occupied country
because of fear of persecution in that country on account of race,
religion, or political opinion," he may apply for entry on parole which
status can be granted at the discretion of the local District Director. 9 9
B. Practice under Section 203(a)(7)
Although there are relatively few reports to date of judicial or
administrative proceedings involving the interpretation of Section
203(a)(7), it has already been recognized in administrative practice that
the " . . . statutory standards for refugee status under Section
203(a)(7)... are substantially broader" than those of Section
243(h),1 0 0 either before or since the amendment of the latter in 1965.
9' See, §§ 251-257, 66 Stat. 219-23; 8 U.S.C. §§ 1281-1287, for immigration controls
over alien crewmen.
98 A crewman is not entitled to a hearing before a Special Inquiry Officer. United States ex

rel. Kordic v. Esperdy, 276 F.Supp. 1, 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), (dismissing petition for writ of
habeas corpus following immigration interview ordered by the District Court to be held with
procedural safeguards. United States ex rel. Kordic v. Esperdy, 274 F.Supp. 873 (S.D.N.Y.
1967)), aff'd. 386 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1967). A crewman can question his detention in a habeas
corpus proceeding. Vucinic v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 243 F.Supp. 113 (D.Ore.
1965).
99 8 C.F.R. § 253.1(0, implementing § 212(d)(5), 66 Stat. 188; 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5), as
amended by 32 Fed. Reg. 4341 (1967). This provision, formerly numbered 8 C.F.R. §
253.1(e), was promulgated after it had been held that § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) was
available to crewmen although they were, by definition, excludable aliens. United States ex rel.
Szlajmer v. Esperdy, 498-500, cited note 62. See, Glavic v. Beechie, 225 F.Supp. 24, 27 (S.D.
Texas 1963) (stating that Szlajmer was not in accord with the Congressional intent regarding §
243(h). See also, Sui Fung Luk v. Rosenberg, 276 F.Supp. 909 (C.D.Cal. 1967). Suspension of
deportation was barred to crewmen entering the country after June 30, 1964. 79 Stat. 918
(1965).
1oo Matter of Adamska, Int. Dec. No. 1727, 1 (1967)(relief had been denied in 1960 to
this applicant under § 243(h).
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This view has been evident in several administrative proceedings based
upon the proviso to Section 203 (a)(7):
That immigrant visas in a number not exceeding one-half the
number specified in this paragraph may be made available, in lieu of
conditional entries of a like number, to such aliens who have been
continuously physically present in the United States for a period
of at
1

least two years prior to application for adjustment of status. 0 1

The alien applies for classification as a refugee under Section 203(a)(7)
and for adjustment of status under Section 245 of the Immigration arid
Nationality Act as amended.' 02 It is evident from the cases to date
that the soi-disant refugee must establish five points in order to be
eligible for such classification. He must show that:
1) the application is being made in a non-Communist or nonCommunist-dominated country; 2) he fled his country because of
persecution or fear of persecution on account of race, religion, or
political opinion; 3) he fled a Communist or Communist-dominated
country or a country within the general area of the Middle East; 4) he is
unable or unwilling to return to such country or area on account of
race, religion, or political opinion; and 5) he has not firmly settled in
some other country since fleeing his homeland.' 0 3 Point 1 has been
established by administrative regulation which provides that applications for conditional entry must be made from Austria, Belgium,
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, or Lebanon.' 1 04 Point 3 has been
defined in the statute in geographical terms as "

. .

. the area between

and including (1) Libya on the west, (2) Turkey on the north, (3)
Pakistan on the east, and (4) Saudi Arabia and Ethiopia on the
south

. .

.

"'

0 I The fact that persecution in the homeland forced the

alien to flee that country must be proved.' 6 The fact that the
'01 Section 203(a)(7), 66 Stat. 178; 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7), as amended by § 3, 79 Stat.
913 (1965). The proviso makes a maximum of 5100 visas available.
102 Section 245, 66 Stat. 217; 8 U.S.C. § 1255. 8 C.F.R. § 245.2. See also, §§ 203(0
(g)(h), 66 Stat. 178; 8 U.S.C. §§ 1153(f)(g)(h), as amended by § 3, 79 Stat. 914-15 (1965).
Matter of Tom, 111. & N. Dec. 798 (1966) (adjustment of status must follow the procedures of

§ 245).

103 No other points need be made. A hearing officer's effort to require that the alien show
that he could find sanctuary elsewhere than in the United States was disallowed. Matter of
Moy, Int. Dec. No. 1708 (1967).
104 8 C.F.R. § 235.9. In Tai Mui v. Esperdy, 371 F.2d 772 (2d Cir. 1966). cert. denied,
386 U.S. 1017 (1967), it was argued unsuccessfully that this regulation was invalid because it
omitted the United States as a non-Communist state from which conditional entry could be
made.
105 Section 203(a)(7), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7). This is the geographical definition which was
used in § 15(c) of the 1957 Act. 71 Stat. 639.
1 06 Persecution was not proved in the following cases: Matter of Frisch, Int. Dec. No. 1686

InternationalLawyer, Vol. 3 No. 2

The PoliticalRefugee

225

individual fled from the homeland is not in itself proof of persecution,
especially where there has been a lapse of time between this departure
and the application for the conditional entry.' 0 On the other hand,
the applicant does not have to establish that upon returning to the
homeland, he would, in fact, be subject to persecution there on account
of race, religion, or political opinion.' 0 ' Resettlement in another
country than the homeland is defined as a "firm" tie, e.g., living in
Taiwan and working for the Republic of China for sixteen years or
enjoyment of permanent residence in Colombia, including a partnership
interest in a farm and maintenance of a bank account there.' 0 9 Such a
relationship does not exist where it has been shown that the alien's
family had been paroled from Hong Kong into the United States and
that her husband was temporarily in Canada as a student.' 1 0 A travel
document for a refugee's return to Hong Kong was interpreted as a
formality and not as "

. .

. conclusive evidence of resettlement in that

area."' ' ' Relief under Section 203(a)(7) is not apparently available,
however, to alien crewmen as a substitute for adjustment of status
under Section 245 which is also denied to them.' 12
III Political Asylum under Section 243(h)
In examining the usefulness of Section 243(h) to the soi-disant
political refugee, it must be borne in mind that an excluded alien does
not have standing to invoke this provision. This rule applies to the alien
denied admission under the exclusionary rules of the 1952 Act as
amended and to the alien who is admitted under parole.
A. Expulsion Procedure
An examination of some 100 administrative and court cases in
which Section 243(h) has been at issue indicates that most applicants
(1967)(Yugoslavia); Matter of Lalian, Int. Dec. No. 1709(1967)(Iran); Matter of Shirinian, Inc.
Dec. No. 1773 (1967)(United Arab Republic). It was proved in Matter of Adamska, cited note

100.
Matter of Sun, Int. Dec. No. 1685 (1966).
108 Matter of Frisch, cited note 106; Matter of Moy, cited note 103.
109 Matter of Sun, cited note 107; Matter of Moy, Int. Dec. No. 1707 (1967).
110 Matter of Hung, Int. Dec. No. 1722 (1967).
'''
Matter of Chai, Int. Dec. No. 1698, 2 (1967). In this case and in Matter of Hung, cited
note 110, a factor in the affirmative decision appeared to be recognition of the responsibility
assumed under the 1962 program for the parole of Chinese refugees from Hong Kong. See, p.
15, above.
112 Tai Mui v. Esperdy, cited note 104. See also, Wing Wa Lee v. Immigration and
107
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are persons who have been admitted into the country as nonimmigrants-visitors, students, seamen, diplomatic personnel-while
only a few have entered illegally, as stowaways or as aliens excludable
under the 1952 Act.
Where an alien is suspected of being deportable, an interview or a
preliminary hearing may be held at the discretion of an immigration
inspector. In a recent case, it was held that the alien had no right to
counsel during this proceeding nor to the admission of any sworn
statement which he might make as evidence in any subsequent
proceeding.' ' If the investigator is satisfied that there are grounds for
further proceedings, the alien is served with an order to show cause as
to why deportation should not take place.'"' The alien may be
arrested and held in custody or released on bond pending the final
determination of his deportability.' ' I He must be advised of his right
to communicate with a diplomatic or consular representative of his
country; and the United States is bound by treaty to notify the
representatives of certain countries whenever any of their nationals are
detained for exclusion or expulsion proceedings whether the alien so
detained requests it or not.' 16 If deportability is conceded, a public
hearing is held by a Special Inqtiry Officer, who is not the officer who
investigated the case.' ' " In certain other cases, e.g. where deportability
is not conceded or where discretionary relief is sought inter alia under
Section 243(h), a trial attorney is assigned by the District Director to
conduct the proceedings on behalf of the Government, and the Special
Inquiry Officer acts as judge.' '" At the hearing before the Special
Naturalization Service, 375 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1967); Lam Leung Kam v. Esperdy, 274 F.Supp.
485 (S.D.N.Y. 1967)(denying relief under § 234(h).
113 Nason v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 370 F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1967). The
Court pointed out that the preliminary hearing is not a criminal proceeding. See also, Ah Chiu
Pang v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 368 F.2d 637, 639 (3d Cir. 1966).
114 8 C.F.R. § 242.1(a).
11 s 8 C.F.R. § 242.2; § 242, 66 Stat. 208; 8 U.S.C. § 1252. Aliens may depart voluntarily
without arrest or a hearing if they are not politically subversive, do not have a record of
conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude, narcotics offenses, morals offenses, violation
of firearms laws, violation of the Alien Registration Act of 1940, or are not found to be
otherwise undesirable persons. Sections 241(a)(4)(5), 66 Stat. 204; 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a)(4)(5),
8 C.F.R. § 242.5.
116 8 C.F.R. § 242.2(e), as amended, 32 Fed. Reg. 5619 (1967). The countries are China,
Costa Rica, Cyprus, Gambia, Ghana, Ireland (unless the alien objects), Jamaica, Kenya, Kuwait,
Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Nigeria, Philippines, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Tanzania, Trinidad &
Tobago, Uganda, United Kingdom (England, Northern Ireland, Scotland, Southern Rhodesia,
Wales), and Zambia.
it? Section 242(b), 66 Stat. 209; 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b).
118 8 C.F.R. § 242.9, as amended, 32 Fed. Reg. 9631 (1967); § 242.15(b)(c). A trial
attorney will be assigned to a case at the request of the Special Inquiry Officer, to a case in
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Inquiry Officer, the alien must be informed of his right to counsel "at

no expense to the Government," his right to present evidence and
witnesses on his own behalf, to examine evidence presented by the
immigration authorities, and to cross-examine their witnesses. 11 9 He
must also be advised of the possibility of applying for temporary
withholding of deportation pursuant to the terms of Section 243(h):
The respondent has the burden of satisfying the Special Inquiry
Officer that he would be subject to persecution on account of race,
religion, or political opinion as claimed. The determination under
section 243(h) of the Act may be based upon information not of record
if, in the opinion of the Special Inquiry Officer or the Board [of
Immigration Appeals], the disclosure of such information would be
prejudicial to the interests of the United States." 20
The determination of deportability must be based upon

...

clear,

unequivocal and convincing evidence." ' ' 2' Denial of discretionary relief
or any other decision in a deportation case is open to review by the
Board of Immigration Appeals.' 22 A hearing may be reopened if the
Special Inquiry Officer is "

. .

. satisfied that the evidence sought to be

offered is material and was not available and could not have been
discovered or presented at the hearing."' ' 2 3 The burden of proof is on
the alien.' 24 The final order of deportation may be executed within six
months of the date of issuance or of the date of a final court order if
the decision has been submitted to iudicial review and affirmed.' 2 s In
which an alien, not represented by counsel, is found to be incompetent or to be a minor
without a guardian, relative, or friend, ... to every case in which the Commissioner approves
the submission of nonrecord information," and at the discretion of the District Director in any
other case.
''9 8 C.F.R. §§ 242.10, 242.16(a). The alien may be assisted by an interpreter. Section
in immigration proceedings, see, Boutilier v. Immigration and
242.12. On right to cou
O.S. 118 (1967) and Nason v. Immigration and Naturalization
Naturalization Service, 3t
Service, cited note 113.
120 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(c). Prior to 1962, § 243(h) could be invoked only after a final
determination of deportation had been made. 8 C.F.R. § 243.3(b) (1958 rev.).
121 8 C.F.R. § 242.14(a), as amended, 32 Fed. Reg. 2883 (1967). As to procedure, see
MacLeod v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 327 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1964). See also,
notes 199, 200.
122 § 242.21. Review of the Board's decision by the Attorney General is also possible. 8
C.F.R. § 3.1(h). If such review is challenged as summary, the possibility of judicial review saves
the situation. See, Klapholz v. Esperdy, 201 F.Supp. 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd. 302 F.2d 928
(2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied 371 U.S. 891 (1962).
123 8C.F.R. § 242.22.
124 Cheng Kai Fu V. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 386 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1967).
Reopening of a hearing after § 243(h) was amended in 1965, was denied on grounds that the
record of the original hearing clearly established the fact that respondent would not be
persecuted in Italy. Matter of De Lucia, Int. Dec. No. 1575, 17 (1966).
125 Section 242(c), 66 Stat. 210; 8 U.S.C. § 1251(c).
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practice the alien is generally released on bond during the six months

period. At the termination of this period, the bond is cancelled, and the
alien is placed on supervised parole. The alien will be deported to the
country of his choice unless such country refuses to accept him or the
Attorney General, in his discretion, considers that this destination
".. . would be prejudicial to the interests of the United States." 12 6 In

the alternative, the Attorney General may deport the alien to the
country of his nationality, or if that country will not accept him, to
one of seven alternate destinations, predicated upon such considerations as place of last departure, previous residence, and birth.' 2 7
B.

Judicial Review

The Courts of Appeals have exclusive jurisdiction to review final
orders of deportation including the Attorney General's denial of

discretionary
hearing."2

relief rendered during the course of a deportation
Such review is available only if the alien is still in the

country, but a stay of deportation is automatic when a petition for
review is filed in a Court of Appeals.I' '2 The legality of an alien's

detention or a question of authorization of bond may be reviewed by a
District Court in a habeas corpus proceeding.' 0 An action in a District
126 Section 243(a), 66 Stat. 212; 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a).
127

Sections 243(a)(1)-(7), 66 Stat. 212-13; 8 U.S.C. §§ 1253(a)(1)-(7). The provisions of

the 1943 Act regarding deportation in wartime were incorporated into the 1952 Act. Sections
243(b)(1)(2), 66 Stat. 213; 8 U.S.C. §§ 1253(b)(1)(2).
128 Section 106(a)(2); 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(2), added by § 5, 75 Stat. 651, 653 (1961).
Before 1962, all judicial review of these cases was in the District Courts. A difference in
interpretation among the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits as to whether orders denying
discretionary relief were reviewable first in the Courts of Appeals, in view of the absence of any
reference to this matter in § 106, 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a) regarding judicial review by Courts of
Appeals, was resolved by the Supreme Court in Foti v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,
375 U.S. 217 (1963). The Court held that a challenge to the exercise of discretion by the
Attorney General was reviewable only in the Courts of Appeals. Although Foti concerned
application of § 244(f)(1), 66 Stat. 214; 8 U.S.C. § 1254(f)(1), the Court indicated that the
rule of Foti applied to other provisions of the immigration laws in which the Attorney General
was authorized to exercise his discretion, e.g. § 243(h). It may be added that the Supreme
Court's decision in Foti resulted in a denial of justice to certain aliens who having commenced
proceedings for review in District Courts found that the six months time limit for filing in
Courts of Appeals had expired by the time that Foti was decided. See, Grubisic v. Esperdy, 229
F.Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), Liadakis v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 339 F.2d
447 (4th Cir. 1964). Cf. Cushnie v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 277 F.Supp. 748
(E.D. Pa. 1968).
129 Section 106(c); 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c), added by § 5, 75 Stat. 653 (1961).
Cf. Jimenez
v. Barber, 252 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1958) in which a stay of deportation was denied by the
Supreme Court while review was pending. 355 U.S. 943 (1958).
130 Section 242(a), 66 Stat. 208; 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), as amended by 75 Stat. 651.
Exclusionary orders may be reviewed only through habeas corpus proceedings. Section 106(b);
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Court for a declaratory judgment is also available as a means of review
of immigration orders which are not final.' 31 A request for injunctive
relief may be joined with this action. 32 Where the basic facts or
conclusions have been adjudicated in a criminal proceeding, an alien is
precluded from relitigating the issues on a petition to review a
deportation order unless some new grounds or bases are shown for the
relitigation. 13a
As there is substantial administrative discretion involved in these
proceedings, the courts are reluctant to interfere with the Attorney
General's exercise of such discretion unless the alien, who has the
burden of proof, can show that the descision was arbitrary, abusive, or
otherwise violative of the law.1
Grounds for complaint under Section
234(h) up to 1963 were primarily directed to denial of due process of
law because of alleged absence of a full and proper hearing. 1 35 The
courts indicated that the standard here was whether the proceeding had
been fair.' I6 It has been argued that the Attorney General acted
arbitrarily and capriciously in finding that the alien would not be
subject to persecution if deported.' II Refusal of immigration authorities to reopen administrative proceedings in order to permit the
plaintiff to invoke Section 243(h) after such plea had previously been
withdrawn has been successfully challenged as arbitrary conduct.' 38, It
8 U.S.C. §105a(b), added by § 5, 75 Stat. 653.
131 Section 106(c); 8 U.S.C. § ll05a(c), added by § 5, 75 Stat. 653. 5 U.S.C.
§ 1009.
See, Vucinic v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, cited note 98 (denial of parole to
crewman); Roumeliotis v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 354 F.2d 236 (7th Cir.
1966), cert. denied 384 U.S. 907 (1966). See also, Tai Mui v. Esperdy, cited note 104; Yamada
v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 384 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1967); Cheng Fan Kwok v.
Immigration and Naturalization Service, 381 F.2d 542 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. granted, 390 U.S.
918 (1968).
132 28 U.S.C. § 2202; 5 U.S.C. § 703.
133 Sections 242(c), 276, 66 Stat. 210, 229; 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(c), 1326.
134 See, Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952)(regarding 1950 Act). Cf United
v.
Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194 (1957); Spinella v. Esperdy, 188 F.Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
13s E.g. Batistic v. Pilliod, 188 F.Supp. 344 (N.D. I11.1960), aff'd. 286 F.2d 268 (7th Cir.
1961), rehearing denied en banc (1961), cert. denied 366 U.S. 935 (1961); United States ex rel.
Paschalidis v. Distrit Director, 143 F.Supp. 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Chao-ling Wang v. Pilliod, 285
F.2d 517 (7th Cir. 1960).
136 United States ex rel. Kaloudis v. Shaughnessy, 180 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1950), 106 F.
Supp. 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1952)(dismissing habeas corpus petition), aff'd.per curiam 198 F.2d 568
(2d Cir. 1952). See also, Cakmar v. Hoy, 265 F.2d 59 (9th Cir. 1959); Sunjka v. Esperdy, 182
F.Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), cert. denied sub nom. Roncevich v. Esperdy, 364 U.S. 815
(1960); Vardjan v. Esperdy, 197 F.Supp. 931 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd per curiam 303 F.2d
279 (2d Cir. 1962).
137 United States ex rel. Fong Foo v. Shaughnessy, 234 F.2d 715 (2d Ci. 1956); Zupicich
v. Esperdy, 207 F.Supp. 574 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd. 319 F.2d 773 (2d Ci. 1963).
138 United States ex rel. Mercer v. Esperdy, 234 F.Supp. 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). Reopening
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may be alleged that the Special Inquiry Officer's decision was
"arbitrary and erroneous in law,"' 1 9 that there has been an abuse of
discretion by the Attorney General or his subordinates,' ' 0 or a failure
by these officials to exercise such discretion.' " The administrative
decision may be attacked on grounds that it was not "adequately

supported."' 42 The Government's statement, made prior to a deportation proceeding, that it intended to deport the alien, was held to

constitute prejudgment of the case and grounds for another hearing in
which to test the question of whether the alien were entitled to

discretionary relief.'

3

However, a prima facie case must be made if

relief is to be granted on the grounds of prejudgment.' 44 An attempt
to reopen the hearing in order to present evidence of potential
persecution in the light of the 1965 revision of Section 243(h) was
denied where the movant did not show that he had facts or evidence to
present other than what he had submitted in the first hearing.' 4
In reviewing administrative denials of discretionary relief under
Section 243(h), the courts generally see their role as limited to
determining whether there are procedural grounds for complaint. The
courts will consider whether an abuse of discretion by the Attorney
General has been shown, or due process of law, patently denied in the
administrative proceeding.' 46 Beyond these considerations, "[i] f the
was denied where extradition proceedings were in progress against the applicant. Matter of
Perez Jimenez, 10 1. & N. Dec. 309 (1963).
139 Dunat v. Hurney, 183 F.Supp. 349 (E.D. Pa. 1960), rev'd. 297
F.2d 744 (3d Cir.
1961); Diminich v. Esperdy, 299 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied 369 U.S. 844 (1962);
Lena v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 379 F.2d 536 (7th Cir. 1967).
140 E.g. United States ex rel. Cantisani v.. Holton, 248 F.2d 737 (7"th Cir. 1957), cert.
denied
356 U.S. 932 (1958); Obrenovich v. Pilliod, 282 F.2d 874 (7th Cir. 1960); Diminich v.
Esperdy, cited note 139.
141 E.g. United States ex rel. Fong Foo v. Shaughnessy, cited note 137; Dombrovskis
v.
Esperdy, 195 F.Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), 209 F.Supp. 673 (S.D.N.Y. 1962),aff'd. 321 F.2d
463 (2d Cir. 1963).
142 United States ex rel. Cantisani v. Holton, cited note 140; Ng Kam Fook v. Esperdy,
209 F.Supp. 637 (S.D.N.Y. 1962),aff'd. 320 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied 375 U.S. 955
(1963); Dabrowski v. Holland, 259 F.2d 449 (3d Cir. 1958).
143 Bufalino v. Kennedy, 322 F.2d 1016 (D.C.Cir. 1963). See also, United States ex rel.
Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954) for a similar argument under § 19 of the 1917
Act.
144 De Lucia v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 370 F.2d 305 (7th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied 386 U.S. 912 (1967).
145 Novinc v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 371 F.2d 272 (7th Cir. 1967);
Matter of Bufalino, 11 1. & N. Dec. 351 (1965).
146 E.g. Almeida v. Murff, 159 F.Supp. 484 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Feng Yeat Chow v.
Shaughnessy, 151 F.Supp. 23 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Blagaic v. Flagg, 304 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1962);
Schieber v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 347 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1965).
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reasons for refusing to suspend deportation stated by the Attorney
General are sufficient on their face, the court cannot make further
inquiry.,"'

'

"Impropriety," in the exercise of the Attorney General's

discretion, "will not be presumed." 1 48 The Court, for example,
"... cannot engage in the speculation which the plaintiffs invite" that
they would be persecuted for their religious beliefs where no evidence
had been brought forward to substantiate this allegation.1 ' Judicial
reluctance to explore beyond the surface of Section 243(h) proceedings
stems in considerable measure from concern for the political factor
which is often an overt and usually a covert element in such cases. As
the Supreme Court put it in considering an expulsion case arising in a
different context: "The power to expel aliens, being essentially a power
of the political branches of government, the legislative and executive,
may be exercised entirely through executive officers, 'with such
opportunity for judicial review of their action as Congress may see fit
to authorize or permit."" I 0 The political factor has been implicit, for
example, with regard to the grounds upon which a deportation order
has been based. As the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit pointed
out in Namkung v. Boyd, .....

nothing in the statute suggests that the

court may insist that the Attorney General's opinion be based solely on
evidence which is disclosed to the alien." ' 5' Where the Immigration
and Naturalization Service classified anti-Communist refugees from
Yugoslavia separately from other anti-Communist refugees, the District
Court for the Southern District of New York did not deem this action
an arbitrary or capricious exercise of administrative discretion although
it did note that such an exercise of administrative discretion is open to
judicial

review.

Judge

Palmieri stated that "

. .

. [t] he particular

question raised involves a decision as to foreign policy traditionally left
to the executive branch of the government."' 1 2
147 Obrenovich v. Pilliod, 876, cited note 140. See also, Kalatjis v. Rosenberg, 305
F.2d
249 (9th Cir. 1962); Hyppolite v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 382 F.2d 98 (7th
Cir. 1967).
148 Feng Yeat Chow v. Shaughnessy, 26, cited note 146.
149 Sunjka v. Esperdy, 601, cited note 136.
is0 Carlson v. Landon, 537, cited note 134. See also, Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 (1956);

Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1945). Justice Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion, said
"... the place to resist unwise or cruel legislation touching aliens in the Congress, not this
Court." Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 598, cited note 51.
151 226 F.2d 385, 389 (1955), quoting United States ex rel. Dolenz v. Shaughnessy, 206
F.2d 392, 394-95 (2d Cir. 1953).
152 Sunjka v. Esperdy, 601, cited note 136, citing United States ex rel. Leong Choy Moon
v. Shaughnessy, 218 F.2d 316 (2d Cir. 1954).
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The political factor has also been evident in a series of cases in
which the deportable alien chose as his destination a country with
which the United States had no diplomatic relations and then sought
the withholding of deportation by invoking Section 243(h). According
to Section 243(a) of the 1952 Act, the alien may designate the country
to which he is to be deported, and the Attorney General will send him
there, provided that that country is willing to receive the alien,
"...

unless the Attorney General, in his discretion, concludes that

deportation to such country would be prejudicial to the interests of the
United States."' 53 In a 1956 case a deportable alien who was a Greek
national sued to enjoin deportation and vacate the order for his
surrender on ground that the order was defective because no country of
destination was named in it, thereby depriving him of the opportunity
to invoke Section 243(h).' 1 s 4 The plaintiff designated Albania as his
destination despite the fact that the United States did not maintain
diplomatic relations with that country. After the Department of State
notified him that it would not request permission for him to enter
Albania, he undertook to negotiate directly with Albanian authorities.' ' ' Apparently, the strategy was to designate and be granted
permission to enter the unrecognized country and then invoke Section
243(h) as a bar to deportation to that country. The strategy did not
work in this case, for the plaintiff was deported to Greece, a decision
1
which could not be challenged under Section 243(h) on the facts. s 6
In Chao Chin Chen v. Esperdy, the plaintiff designated the People's
Republic of China as his destination and then applied under Section
243(h) for withholding of deportation.1 ' ' The plaintiff argued that the
Government should inquire of this unrecognized government whether it
would accept him and that he should have a hearing on his application
under Section 243(h). Judge Kaufman held that by resorting to Section
243(h) after designating mainland China as the destination, the plaintiff
had revoked this designation and was, consequently, not entitled to
demand that the Government make inquiries on his behalf with
mainland China or to have a hearing on the possibility of his potential
persecution there. In 1959 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held that where Formosa was the designated country and had refused
Section 243(a)(1)-(7), 66 Stat. 212; 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a)(1)-(7). See also,
Lezos v. Landon, 235 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1956).
155 In Hom Sin v. Esperdy, it was held that the Government could not avoid its "political
perdicament" of nonrecognition of the People's Republic of China by forcing the alien to make
the inquiry. 209 F.Supp. 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
156 See also, Katselianos v. Esperdy, 222 F.Supp. 944 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
157 168 F.Supp. 349 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
153
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to receive the alien, and the Attorney General had ordered him
deported to mainland China, the Government must ascertain whether
the alien would be accepted by mainland China as this was a
requirement of the statute.' s 8 To the Government's argument that
such an inquiry would constitute recognition and, hence, be an invasion
of Executive policy, Judge Learned Hand replied that as some "mutual
agreement" between states is envisaged under the statute in order to
send an alien to another country, a preliminary inquiry would not
involve any more "recognition." 1 I This position of Judge Hand was
not followed, however, in a series of cases in which the courts became
concerned with the frequency of designation of the People's Republic
of China as a destination and concluded that such designation was a
circuitous way of using Section 243(h) as a bar to deportation.'6 0
The constitutionality of Section 243(h) has been questioned upon
occasion. In 1956, Judge Jerome Frank warned: "A statute should, if
possible, be so construed as not to be-or to come close to the brink of
being-unconstitutional. This statute comes close to that brink, and
perhaps goes over it, if interpreted to give the Attorney General, or any
of his subordinates, arbitrary power."' 1 61 It was contended in
Obrenovic v. Pilliod that the Section was an unconstitutional delegation
of legislative power in violation of the doctrine of separation of
powers. 1 6 2 This argument was dismissed, however, on the reasoning
that the Section is an appropriate use of the plenary power of Congress
1
to expel aliens. 63
IS8 United States ex rel. Tom Man v. Murff, 142 F.Supp. 444 (S.D.N.Y.
1956), aff'd. 264
F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1959). Section 243(a)(7), 66 Stat. 213; 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a)(7). At a hearing
under § 243(h), it was determined that the relator would not be subject to physical persecution
in mainland China.
159 264 F.2d 926, 928. See also, Lam Man Chi v. Bouchard, 314 F.2d 664 (3d Cir. 1963).
160 Ng Kam Fook v. Esperdy, cited note 142. Justices Douglas and Black dissenting to the

denial of a writ of certiorariin this case said: "The decision below is predicated in part upon
nonrecognition of the Peking regime by the United States, and the fear that a contrary holding
would require a preliminary inquiry concerning its willingness to accept petitioners which
'might impliedly suggest recognition and thus might embarrass the decisions of the Executive
Department as to foreign policies.' . . . Since the question touches a basic human right and since
the proper construction of the statute poses a substantial question which should be considered
by this Court, I would grant certiorari." 375 U.S. 955, 956. See also, United States ex rel.
Ratkovic v. Esperdy, 185 F.Supp. 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Lat Tat Sin v. Esperdy, 227 F.Supp.
482 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff'd. 334 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied 379 U.S. 28 (1964); Chi
Sheng Liu v. Holton, 297 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1961), rehearingdenied (1962); Matter of Niesel,
10 1. & N. Dec. 57 (1962).
161 United States ex rel. Fong Foo v. Shaughnessy, cited
note 137.
162 Cited note 140.
163 Ibid., 876, quoting Carlson v. Landon, cited note 134. This same argument was
dismissed in Petrovic v. Pilliod on the basis of Obrenovic, 282 F.2d 877 (7th Cir. 1960), cert.
denied sub nom. Roncevich v. Esperdy, 364 U.S. 815 (1960).
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C.

Nature of Plea to Section 243(h)

Aliens have offered a variety of grounds for invoking Section
243(h) as a bar to deportation. These grounds may be classified for
convenience into six categories: political reasons, cultural reasons,
activities in the asylum state, nature of the destination, source of
persecution in the destination, and kind of persecution anticipated in
the destination.
1. Political Reasons
An obvious plea is membership of an organization opposed to the
government in power in the state of destination, especially where the
latter is authoritarian in character. This organization may be a political
party or faction, a politically proscribed labor union, or a student
opposition group.' 64 Related to this argument is the fear of reprisals
for having refused to join the political organization in power in the
country, usually the Communist Party, or for having expressed opinions
there in opposition to such party." 6 A somewhat different reason is
found in the allegation that a family connection with a person who has
been subjected to political persecution in the state of destination would
lead to persecution of the petitioner.' 66 Where defection is in itself a
treasonous act, it affords another ground for endeavoring to avoid
deportation to the state of previous residence. 67
2. CulturalReasons
Fear of persecution because of religious beliefs has been frequently advanced under Section 243(h). The complaint is usually
Almeida v. Murff, cited note 146 (anti-Batistiano); United States ex rel. Paschalidis v.
District Director cited note 135 (member of proscribed Federation of Greek Maritime Unions);
Hyppolite v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, cited note 147 (member of student
anti-government group); Matter of Stojkovic, Int. Dec. No. 1286 (1963)(member of Trujillo's
Anti-Communist Legion); Matter of Rodriguez, Int. Dec. No. 1328 (1964) (member of
minority political party in British Guiana).
165 Petrovic v. Pilliod, cited note 163; Sunjka v. Esperdy, cited note 136; Morin v.
Bouchard, 311 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1962); Sovich v. Esperdy, 206 F.Supp. 558 (S.D.N.Y. 1962),
reversed and remanded 319 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1963); Matter of Banjeglav, Int. Dec. No. 1298
(1963); Matter of Vardjan, Int. Dec. No. 1347 (1964); United States ex rel. Kordic v. Esperdy,
cited note 98.
166 United States ex rel. Mercer v. Esperdy, cited note 138 (family opposition to Duvalier
regime in Haiti; Matter of Perez, Int. Dec. No. 1351 (1964) (nephew of former chief of
Trujillo's Servicio Inteligencia Militar); Matter of Nagy, Int. Dec. No. 1666 (1966) (uncle
defected from Hungary); Matter of Kojoory, Int. Dec. No. 1731 (1967) (grandfather
assassinated for opposition to Iranian Government in 1946).
167 Blazina v. Bouchard, 286 F.2d 507 (3d Cir. 1961), cert. denied 366 U.S. 950 (1961);
Sovich v. Esperdy, cited note 165; Matter of Cavlov, 10 1. & N. Dec. 94 (1962).
164
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directed to a Communist-controlled country in which the petitioner
claims that he was "reviled for churchgoing" or that he would be
"looked down upon" for practicing his religion. 1 6 8 It has been argued
that physical persecution would arise from an attempt to practice
Roman Catholicism in Yugoslavia or in British Guiana (now Guyana),
Eastern Orthodoxy in Turkey, Islam in India, or to proselytize on
behalf of the Jehovah's Witnesses in Greece.'69 One petitioner sought
to advance potential persecution as a Negro in British Guiana as ground
for a grant of administrative discretion.1 70 Another argued that his
membership of the "middle class" which had supported the former
Trujillo regime in the Dominican Republic would subject him to
persecution if he returned to that country. 1 7 ' An Albanian national
sought to avoid deportation to Greece on the ground that a Greek
requirement that aliens register with the police every six months
constituted a form of persecution. 1 72 A doctor of Vietnamese origin
argued that he would be discriminated against in Vietnam because of
his American medical education and his having married an American
national.' 73 Strained relations between India and Pakistan over control
of Kashmir were alleged to have created a situation in which a Moslem
would be liable to persecution if he were deported to India.' I 4
3. Activities in Asylum State
In several cases, deportable aliens have pleaded that their activities
in the United States would lead to persecution in the state of
destination if deportation were carried out. The very fact of endeavoring to avoid deportation by prosecuting administrative and judicial
proceedings was offered as an argument.' 71 Political activity in the
United States offensive to the state of destination, whether taking the
form of membership of the Communist Party' 76 or of anti-Vietnam
168

Batistic v. Pilliod, cited note 135; Blazina v. Bouchard, cited note 167; Merin v.

Bouchard, cited note 165; Blagaic v. Flagg, cited note 146.
169 Roman Catholicism: Sunjka v. Esperdy, cited note 136; Matter of Rodriguez, cited
note 164. Islam: Matter of Eusaph, Int. Dec. No. 1320 (1964). Eastern Orthodoxy: Lena v.
Immigration and Naturalization Service, cited note 139. Jehovah's Witnesses: Matter of
Liadakis, Int. Dec. No. 1279 (1963).
170 Matter of Rodriguez, cited note 164.
171 Matter of Diaz, 10 1. & N. Dec. 199 (1963).
172 Katselianos v. Esperdy, cited note 156.
173 Matter of Nghiem, 11 1. & N. Dec. 541 (1966).
174

Matter of Eusaph, cited note 169.

175 Matter of Vardjan, cited note 165.
176

Polites v. Sahli, 193 F.Supp. 842 (E.D.Mich. 1961), aff'd. 302 F.2d 449 (6th Cir.
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interest groups,' 77 or the expression of political views which might be
taken notice of by the state of destination to the disadvantage of the
deported alien' 7 8 are other arguments in this category. It has also been
contended that an alien's long criminal record in the United States
could lead to stringent controls over his conduct in the
state of
1 79
persecution.
physical
constitute
would
destination which
4. Nature of Destination
The most common fear for which Section 243(h) is invoked is
concern for the generally hostile attitude and concomitant treatment
which the alien might expect to experience in the state of destination.
This is a general plea of physical persecution. It has been advanced
against such countries as China, the Dominican Republic, Greece, Haiti,
Hong Kong, Italy, Korea, Poland, Taiwan, United Arab Republic, and
Yugoslavia.' 8 0 But physical persecution within the state of destination
is not the only concern here. Aliens have argued that the likelihood of
expulsion from the destination is cause for withholding deportation;' 8a ' or they have offered this contention as a kind of "ultimate
destination" theory, to the effect that the state of destination would
send the alien on to another and more hostile destination, e.g. from
Hong Kong or the Netherlands to the People's Republic of China or
from West Germany to Rumania.' 82 The reverse and rather extreme
version of this argument was presented in the contention that if the
alien and his family were deported to Turkey, they might be subjected
1962), cert. denied 371 U.S. 916 (1962); Namkung v. Boyd, cited note 151.
177 Matter of Nghiem, cited note 173.
178 Petrovic v. Pilliod, cited note 163 (Yugoslavia); Matter of Kojoory, cited note 166
(Iran).
Matter of Bufalino, cited note 145; Matter of De Lucia, cited note 124. The 1965
amended version of § 243(h) was invoked in both cases.
180 China: United States ex rel. Tom Man v. Murff, cited note 158; Lam Tat Sin v.
179

Esperdy, cited note 160; Dominican Republic: Matter of Stojkovic, cited note 164; Greece:
United States ex rel. Paschalidis v. District Director, cited note 135; Haiti: United States ex rel.
Mercer v. Esperdy, cited note 138; Hong Kong: Lam Leung Kam v. Esperdy, cited note 112;
Italy: Matter of Bufalino, cited note 145; Korea: Namkung v. Boyd, cited note 151; Poland:
Schieber v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, cited note 146; Taiwan: Chi Sheng Liu v.
Holton, cited note 160; United Arab Republic: Matter of Salama, A10753303 (Mar. 28, 1966);
Yugoslavia: United States ex rel. Ratkovic v. Esperdy, cited note 160; Matter of Vardjan, cited

note 165.
181
182

Matter of Stojkovic, cited note 164.
China: Kam Ng v. Pilliod, 279 F.2d 207 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied 365 U.S. 860

(1961); Matter of Ng, Int. Dec. No. 1314 (1963); Rumania: Holz v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service, 259 F.2d 84 (9th Cir. 1958), 309 F.2d 452 (9th Cir. 1962).
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to persecution should Soviet Russia ever seize control of Turkey, 183
or, in the case of Hong Kong, should the People's Republic of China
ever take over that British Crown Colony.' 84 A somewhat different
approach was taken by certain aliens seven or eight years ago who

argued with regard to Taiwan that it was not a "political entity" to
which a person might be deported within the terms of the immigration
laws.' 8
5. Source of Persecutionin Destination
The presumption that persecution whether "physical" or "on
account of race, religion, or political opinion" would emanate from the
political authorities in power in the state of destination would seem to
be self-evident. Efforts have been made by aliens, however, to establish
the point that political persecution could emanate from non-governmental sources. Potential persecution by the Communist Party or a
para-Communist organization in Greece, Italy, Indonesia, or the
Dominican Republic has been urged as ground for withholding
deportation. 8 6 Several aliens have sought to avoid deportation to the
Dominican Republic, fearing mob violence because of their association

with the former Trujillo regime.' 8 7
6. Kind of PersecutionAnticipated in Destination

Various kinds of persecution anticipated by the alien in the state
of destination have been brought forward as grounds for relief under
Section 243(h). A common complaint is the alien's liability to criminal
prosecution in the destination for acts committed there or abroad
which would amount, in effect, to persecution because of the political
Cakmar v. Hoy, cited note 136.
United States ex rel. Tom Man v. Murff, cited note 158; Lam
Leung Kam v. Esperdy,
cited note 112, Yui Ting Sang v. Esperdy, 278 F.Supp. 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
18s Chao-ling v. Pilliod, cited note 135; Chi Sheng Liu v. Holton, cited note 160. This
argument was also offered under § 6 of the Refugee Relief Act of 1953, in a case in which the
alien argued that his birthplace which had been located in British Palestine was now under
Jordanian control and that he would be subjected to persecution if deported to Jordan. The
Court held that this argument only established that the alien was stateless, not that he would be
liable to persecution in Jordan. Bajalieh v. Beechie, cited note 69.
186 Greece: Leontis v. Esperdy, 175 F.Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), aff'd. per curiam, 283
F.2d 514 (2d Cir. 1960); Italy: United States ex rel. Cantisani v. Holton, cited note 140;
Indonesia: Matter of Sihasale, Int. Dec. No. 1629 (1966); Dominican Republic: Matter of
Stojkovic, cited note 164.
187 Matter of Diaz, cited note 171; Matter of Stojkovic, cited note 164; Matter of Perez,
cited note 166; Matter of Torres Tejeda, 10 1. & N. Dec. 435 (1964).
183

184
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implications of such acts. Desertion, whether by a merchant seaman, a

naval officer, or a military pilot, has been frequently mentioned as a
potential charge.' 8 8 Other grounds for prosecution include having been
chief of a military intelligence unit under the former Trujillo regime in
the Dominican Republic, illegal departure from Yugoslavia, or staying

abroad too long and an overt reluctance to return to Hungary.' 89
Prosecution in the state of destination on a charge of embezzlement of
government funds' 90 or imprisonment to serve a sentence previously

imposed on the complainant by the state of destination' 9' are two
other situations which would allegedly constitute persecution.
The possibility of imposition of economic sanctions upon the alien
in the destination has been advanced frequently as ground for relief
under Section 243(h). It has been argued that such persecution could

take the form of discrimination in employment or even the denial of
employment.'

92

The alien's economic and social life might be seriously

restricted by the state of destination, or he might be subjected to
general economic harassment.' 9 3 It has been contended that an alien
seaman would be assigned to Yugoslav " . . . ships destined to the
94
Indian Ocean, and [denied] ...scholarships for higher education."'
Allied to this line of argument has been the occasional resort to Section

244(a)(1) of the 1952 Act or the plea that deportation would subject
the alien to unusual hardship, so that this action should be suspended
or voluntary departure permitted. The Board of Immigration Appeals
has held that Section 243(h) provides adequate opportunity for relief
for anyone wishing to bring forward this argument in conjunction with
a plea of persecution for political beliefs.' 9s
188 Merchant seaman: Blagaic v. Flagg, cited note 146; Blazina v. Bouchard, cited note
167; Diminich v. Esperdy, cited note 139; Zupicich v. Esperdy, cited note 137; Matter of
Banjeglav, cited note 165; In re Kale, File No. A9555532 (unpublished decision of Assistant
Commissioner), quoted in extenso in Dombrovskis v. Esperdy, 195 F.Supp. 488, 491-92
(S.D.N.Y. 1961); naval officer: Chao-ling Wang v. Pilliod, cited note 135; military pilot: Matter
of Liao, Int. Dec. No. 1446 (1965).
189 Matter of Torres Tejeda, cited note 187 (military intelligence chief); Sovich v. Esperdy,
cited note 165 (illegal departure); Matter of Nagy, cited note 166 (refusal to return).
190 Matter of Sun, Int. Dec. No. 1661 (1966).
191 Kalatjis v. Rosenberg, cited note 147.
192 Discrimination: Matter of Vardjan, cited note 165; Matter of Bukowska, 10 I. & N.
Dec. 49 (1962); denial of employment: Dunat v. Hurney, cited note 139; Diminich v. Esperdy,
cited note 139; Soric v. Flagg, 303 F.2d 289 (7th Cir. 1962).
193 Matter of Bufalino, cited note 145 (restricted); Matter of Man, Int. Dec. No. 1753
(1967) (harassment).
19, Matter of Banjeglav, 3, cited note 165.
195 Kam Ng v. Pilliod, cited note 182, complainant argued that his health would be
endangered by the water shortage then obtaining in Hong Kong. Respondent argued that
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Attempts have also been made to show that potential military

service in the state of destination would constitute a form of
persecution. One petitioner complained that the fact of deportation
from the United States would subject him to military service in the
"worst area" of Yugoslavia.1 96 Fear of military service per se or fear
that the alien's expressed opposition to military service would lead to
his imprisonment have been offered in an effort to have deportation

withheld.' 9
D. Evidence
By administrative regulation, "[a] determination of deportability
shall not be valid unless it is found by clear, unequivocal and convincing
evidence that the facts alleged as grounds for deportation are true."' '
This is the standard for determining the question of deportability, but
it does not govern the issue of grant of discretionary relief.' 99 Despite
the position of the Board of Immigration Appeals that "

. .

. it is well

recognized that the strict legal rules of evidence do not apply in
administration proceedings such as this [i.e. under § 243(h)] ,"2

00

the

burden of proof which is the responsibility of the alien is an almost
impossible one to carry. Evidence in these proceedings can comprise
written or oral statements by the respondent, testimony of witnesses
called by the Government and the respondent, and, where necessary,
depositions, within the terms of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.2 a In most of the case reports in which there has been any
discussion of the matter, the principal evidence adduced by the alien
has been his testimony that to his knowledge and belief conditions in
the state of destination were as he described them. 2 2 Another form of
deportation to Italy "... would injure him physically and mentally because he would be
separated from his family and [he] is in constant need of medical care," Matter of De Lucia,
15, cited note 124. Respondent contended that he would have " .. . difficulty in adjusting to a
lower standard of living in Iran," Matter of Kojoory, 3, cited note 166.
196 Batistic v. Pilliod, cited note 135.
197 Petrovic v. Pilliod, cited note 163; Glavic v. Beechie, cited note 99.
198 8 C.F.R. § 242.14(a), as amended, 32 Fed. Reg. 2883 (1967).
199 Woodby v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 385 U.S. 276 (1966). The
importance of probative evidence was recognized by the Supreme Court on the grounds that
deportation is a drastic sanction. Gastelum-Quinones v. Kennedy, 374 U.S. 469, 479 (1963).
See also, Matter of Varnias, Int. Dec. No. 1699 (1967).
200 Matter of Sihasale, 7, cited note 186. As deportation is a civil rather than a criminal
proceeding, the "niceties" of federal criminal procedure, including pleading, are not required.
MacLeod v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, cited note 121. Rules of evidence are
flexible. Ah Chiu Pang v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 368 F.2d 637 (3d Cir. 1966).
201 8 C.F.R. § 242.14(c)-(e).
202 "[A]l Ithough the respondent may ultimately have the burden of persuasion, her own
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evidence which is commonly submitted in these proceedings is the
testimony of relatives and friends 2 03 and of experts. 2 04 Respondents

have offered as supporting evidence letters from relatives and friends in
the proposed state of destination 2 0 s and reports from newspapers and
magazines. 06 But the alien may be hampered in acquiring evidence,
for example, from foreign official sources through the use of
interrogatories unless he can show that a procedure exists for securing
such testimony in a given country, based upon a bilateral treaty or
established practice. 2 0 7 The Special Inquiry Officer is not obliged to
subpoena witnesses at the request of the respondent if he is satisfied
that their testimony would not add appreciably to the record.2 08
The Government, on the other hand, has access to more weighty
and probative sources of evidence than does the alien. 2 09 Furthermore,
in a proceeding concerning withholding of deportation under Section
243(h), this information need not be " ... of record if, in the opinion
of the Special Inquiry Officer or the Board, the disclosure of such
information would be prejudicial to the interests of the United
States. 2' 21
Although Almeida and Dolenz suggest that confidential
information need not be disclosed to the court, it was held in Chi Sheng
testimony may be the best-in fact the only-evidence available to her." Matter of Sihasale, 6,
cited note 186.
203 United States ex rel. Kordic v. Esperdy, cited note 98 (husband's two brothers);
Hyppolite v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, cited note 147 advised by "relatives and
friends" about conditions in Haiti); Matter of Diaz, cited note 171 (witness who had been
subjected to mob violence in Dominican Republic).
204 Matter of Liao, cited note 188 (former Governor of Formosa);
Matter of Banjeglav,
cited note 165 (expert on Yugoslav law); Matter of Torres Tejeda, cited note 187 (officer in
former Trujillo regime); Matter of Kojoory, cited note 166 (American professor who had lived
in Iran from 1960 to 1962); Matter of Stojkovic, cited note 164 (respondent's commanding
officer in former Trujillo Anti-Communist Legion).
205 United States ex rel. Cantisani v. Holton, cited note 140; Matter of Liadakis, cited note
169.
206 Matter of Sihasale, cited note 186; Matter of Liao, cited note 188; Matter of Nghiem,
cited note 173.
207 Matter of Vardjan, cited note 165 (alien could not show that the Yugoslav Government
would permit interrogatories to be directed to a Yugoslav official). See, Fed.R.Civ.P. 28(b) See,
22 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846, 1195, 1203.
208 Matter of Torres Tejeda, 8, cited note 187 (refusal to subpoena former Trujillo officials
in exile).
209 Namkung v. Boyd, cited note 151 (letter from Korean Consul General at San
Francisco); Matter of Kojoory, cited note 166 (letter from Department of State); Matter of De
Lucia, cited note 124 (Note Verbale from Italian Ministry of Foreign Relations). "Having in
mind that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, with representatives throughout the
world, has better sources of information than this Court on which to base its decision of the
issue presented by the plaintiffs, and that Congress has accordingly clothed the District Director
with broad discretion in the matter, we do not believe that his decision should be disturbed or
that it represented an abuse of discretion." Lam Leung Kam v. Esperdy, 489, cited note 112.
210 8C.F.R. § 242.17(c).
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Liu that such evidence could not be used "loosely" and that its use was
reviewable.''
With regard to evidence, the Board of Immigration
Appeals stated in Matters of De Lucia that:
Discretionary action by its very nature permits wide latitude to the
authority charged with its exercise. The Attorney General may consider
any evidence which would be of assistance in formulating 'his opinion
(that) the alien would be subject to persecution on account of race,
religion or political opinion.'2 "
Where there was an absence at one point of reliable information as to
conditions prevailing in the People's Republic of China, so that
immigration authorities could not determine whether persons deported
to mainland China would be subjected to persecution as such parties
contended, the Service issued orders under Section 243(h) on October
31, 1956, and June 14, 1957, temporarily staying the deportation of
any Chinese nationals to the mainland.' 13 It has been pointed out
before that the burden of proof is on the alien in the matter of evidence
adduced to prove persecution under Section 243(h); and the burden is
not easy to carry, for the evidence available to the alien is likely to be
based upon surmise, conjecture, and unverified or second-hand reports
which have little conclusive or persuasive effect.' 14 The Government's
evidence, based upon its official reporting agencies, is difficult to
refute. And courts are understandably reluctant to inquire into
policy-making by foreign countries vis 6i vis their own nationals at home
or abroad.2 1 - Courts do, however, take judicial notice, at times of
conditions in a country especially where there is reason to think that
order has been restored in a previously chaotic situation or that the
211 Almeida v. Murff, cited note 146; United States ex rel. Dolenz v. Shaughnessy, cited

note 151; Chi Sheng Liu v. Holton, cited note 160. In Milutin v. Bouchard, a question was
raised as to whether failure to indicate whether disclosure of certain "undisclosed evidence,"
upon which the immigration authorities arrived at a decision adverse to the alien, would have
been prejudicial to the security of the United States. The Supreme Court ordered that
administrative proceedings be reopened so that the alien could invoke the administrative
regulations on the subject in effect at the time of the Court's decision. 370 U.S. 292 (1962),
reversing and remanding 299 F.2d 50 (3d Cir. 1962).
212 Cited note 124. The Board cited United States ex rel. Dolenz v. Shaughnessy, Diminich
v. Esperdy, and United States ex rel. Cantisani v. Holton, cited notes 151, 139, 140
respectively.
213 Leng May Ma v. Barber, cited note S9.
214 In Matter of Liadakis, the Board of Immigration Appeals pointed out that the
respondent had referred to the prosecution of Jehovah's Witnesses in Greece on charges of
proselytism, but had not supported the allegation with details of these cases, p. 5, cited note
169.
215 See, Almeida v. Murff, United States ex rel. Dolenz v. Shaughnessy, and Sovich v.
Esperdy, cited notes 146, 151, 165, respectively.
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government of the country would be prepared to protect the interests
of a returning national against interference by unruly elements.' 1 6
E. Disposition of Cases under Section 243(h)
The question may now be raised as to the function of Section
243(h) as a basis for political asylum in the United States. Generalizing
from the cases examined, and bearing in mind that decisions depend
upon the circumstances of the individual case before a court or the
Board of Immigration Appeals, it may be concluded that few
applications for relief under Section 243(h), either in its original form
or as amended in 1965, have been successful. The bare facts of the case,
the weight of the alien's evidence, the balance between this evidence
and the Government's, or the court's sensitivity to the foreign policy
implications of the case, all militate against a decision for the alien. For
example, an individual pleaded that if he were deported to Cuba he
would be persecuted for having opposed the Batista regime. It was
shown, however, that he had served in this government during the time
of his alleged opposition, albeit suffering brief periods of imprisonment
on political charges, and that the regime had granted him a passport so
that he could visit the United States; consequently, the Court could not
find an issue of fact which would warrant withholding of deportation
under Section 243(h).2 1 Arrest as a member of the former Trujillo
regime in the Dominican Republic together with alleged previous
banishment (relegatio) from that country were not regarded by the
Board of Immigration Appeals as grounds for relief because "actual
mistreatment" was not shown by the respondent. 1 Manifestations of
political dissent toward a regime would have to extend beyond feelings
of opposition or even expressions of opposition to actual evidence of
"anti-government activity."' 2 1 9 Where an alleged opponent of the
Yugoslav Government was shown to have enjoyed a successful career in
the merchant marine despite his political views, the Board found no
grounds for the claim to relief. 2 2 0 Even where a complainant showed
that various members of her family had fled Haiti for political reasons,
216 Namkung v. Boyd, cited note 151 (Korea); United States ex rel. Cantisani
v. Holton,
cited note 140 (Italy); Matter of Bufalino, cited note 145 (Italy); Matter of Torres Tejeda, cited
ntoe 187 (Dominican Republic).
217 Almeida v. Murff, cited note 146.
218 Matter of Stojkovic, cited note 164.
219 Blazina v. Bouchard, cited note 167. Cf. Sovich v. Esperdy,
cited note 165.
220 Matter of Banjeglav, 5, cited note 165.
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some living in France and others, in the United States, the fact that she
herself could complete her high school education in Haiti and was able
later to leave, return and again depart from the country discredited her
plea of fear of persecution should she be deported to Haiti.2 2 1 The
Board does not consider that defection per se " . . renders a returnee
subject to physical persecution," 2 2'2 and classification as a refugee by
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees would only serve
to establish a status for the individual but not the fact of his liability to
persecution by the regime from which he had defected. 2 2 3
Fear of persecution for what may be broadly described as
"cultural" reasons is particularly hard to establish. Where an alien
submitted that he had been reviled in Yugoslavia for practicing his
religious belief, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit sympathized
with him but could go no further: "The repugnance of such a
governmental policy to our own concepts or religious freedom cannot,
however, justify our labelling such actions as 'physical persecution."' 2 2 In Matter of Eusaph the respondent was unable to present
evidence in support of his claim that the Indian Government tolerated
persecution of Moslems.2 2 s Reports that persons had been imprisoned
for terms ranging from thirty hours to five months in Greece for
proselytizing on behalf of the Jehovah's Witnesses were not considered
by the Board to constitute evidence that the respondent would be
subjected to physical persecution there where nothing about the
circumstances of such cases had been brought forward. 2 2 6 Possible
subjection of an alien to violence because of his racial or social status
did not carry weight with the Board where it was shown that the local
government was trying to prevent racial violence or that the local
government was apparently able to maintain order in the country of
proposed destination.2 2 7 A complaint that alien registration in Greece
would constitute persecution of an Albanian national was dismissed as
frivolous and dilatory by the District Court for the Southern District of
New York. 2 2 8 The Board took the position, in another case, that a
221

Hyppolite v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 100, cited note 147. See also,

Matter of Nagy, cited note 166.
222 Matter of Vardjan, 13, cited note 165; Blazina v. Bouchard, cited note 167.
223 Matter of Caylov, cited note 167.
224 Blazina v. Bouchard, 551, cited note 167. See also, Morin v. Bouchard, cited note 165;
Blagaic v. Flagg, 627, cited note 146; In re Kale, 1, cited note 188.
225 P. 2, cited note 169.
226 Matter of Liadakis, 5, cited note 169.
227 Matter of Rodriguez, cited note 164; Matter of Diaz, cited note 171.
228 Katselianos v. Esperdy, cited note 156.
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Vietnamese doctor who complained that his American medical education would cause him to be reviled in Vietnam must have been aware of
national predilections, if any, in that country for doctors trained in
France before coming to the United States to study, not once but
twice. The Board held that the doctor had a responsibility to fulfill his
contract with the South Vietnamese Government to return to serve the
country. 2 9 The doctor was subsequently permitted, however, to apply
for permanent residence.
The contention that the alien's political activities in the United
States, such as membership of a protest group or of the Communist
Party, would be grounds for persecution upon his return to his
homeland has not been found convincing enough to warrant relief
under Section 243(h). Again, the issue is evidence-it is difficult,
essentially, to extrapolate from the action of the alien in one country
to a reaction by the government of another country.2 30 It is equally
difficult to prove a general plea of potential persecution in the state of
destination or the argument of "ultimate destination," 2 31 for in the
absence of a statutory requirement that the Attorney General
".... secure assurances from an accepting country with respect to the
continued residence of a deportee,"232 such proof would require an
investigation into the policy-making processes of a foreign state, a
sensitive matter for all concerned. The Board stated in another such
case that " . .. [w] hat the Netherlands may do after accepting an alien
is of no consequence under the statute." 2"' The argument that the
individual would be persecuted by non-governmental groups or by
mobs also presents a sensitive issue, for it raises the presumption that
the government of a given country cannot protect the inhabitants of its
territory.2
Where it is a "matter of widespread general and public
229
230

Matter of Nghiem, cited note 173.
The plaintiff satisfied the "meaningful association"

test of membership in the

Communist Party of the United States as defined in Rowoldt v. Perfetto, 355 U.S. 115 (1957),
but the fact that he presented "no convincing evidence" to the hearing officers that such
membership would lead to his persecution in Greece was accepted by the Court. Polites v. Sahli,
cited note 176. Justice Douglas was of the opinion that certiorarishould be granted in this case.
See also, Namkung v. Boyd, cited note 151; Petrovic v. Piliod, cited note 163; Matter of
Kojoory, cited note 166; Matter of Bufalino, cited note 145.
231 See, cases cited notes 180, 181, 182.
232 United States ex rel. Tie Sing Eng v. Murff, 165 F.Supp. 633, 634 (S.D.N.Y.
1958)(dismissing application for habeas corpus), aff'd. per curiam 266 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1959),
cert. denied 361 U.S. 840 (1959), rehearingdenied 361 U.S. 904 (1959).
233 Matter of Ng, cited note 182.
234 United States ex rel. Cantisani v. Holton, cited note 140; Matter of Diaz, cited note
171.
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 3 No. 2

The PoliticalRefugee

245

knowledge" that such elements are under control in a country, the alien
must be able to refute this factual situation, or the plea will be
rejected.' 3
The question may be asked as to whether a stronger argument for
relief under Section 243(h) could be found in the nature of the
persecution anticipated by the alien upon his return to the state of
destination. It has been held more than once, however, that the
expectation of prosecution for an offense committed against the laws
of the state of destination before leaving or as a result of leaving that
state is not equivalent to "persecution." Thus, "[p] ossible incarceration for one or two years resulting from illegally deserting a vessel is not
physical persecution within the meaning of Section 243(h)," 2 3 6 and
2
neither is prosecution on a criminal charge, such as embezzlement. 37
The expectation of having to serve a prison sentence in the state of
destination which had been imposed upon the alien prior to his
departure from that country is not comprehended within Section
243(h). 38I Nor is any consideration given to the fact that deportation
in such a case constitutes "disguised extradition." 2 31 Similarly, the
prospect of prosecution on such charges as military desertion, refusing
2
to return to the homeland, or membership of a deposed government 4 0
is not ground for withholding deportation under this Section of the
law. Anticipation of discrimination in employment or of other
economic or social restrictions upon the freedom of the deported alien
in the state of destination has not carried weight as an argument for
relief, again, for want of evidence in support of the alien's contention.2 4 1 When the Board of Immigration Appeals reheard Bufalino
after Section 243(h) was amended in 1965, it dismissed the appeal on
this latter ground:
Whatever physical persecution is claimed by the respondent arises out
of his actions and reputation in the United States. The Government of
Italy is a democratic one and not totalitarian. There is no doubt that if
the respondent were tried [in Italy], he would receive a judicial trial
235 Matter of Sihasale, 4,5,cited note 186.
236 Zupicich v. Esperdy, 774-75, cited note 237; Dunat v. Hurney, cited note 139; In re
Kale, cited note 188; Matter of Banjeglav, cited note 165.
237 Matter of Sun, cited note 107.
238 Kalatjis v. Rosenberg, cited note 147. Matter of M, 6 1. & N. Dec. 660, 665 (1955).
239 See, A. Evans, Acquistion of Custody over the International Fugitive OffenderAlternatives to Extradition: A Survey of United States Practice, 40 BRIT. YB. INT'L. L. 1964,

77(1966).

240 See, cases cited in notes 188, 189.
241 See, cases cited in notes 192, 193.
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with adequate safeguards. The claim of physical persecution stems from
speculation and conjectures related to the respondent himself. There is
no evidence that the respondent would be subject to physical
persecution within Section 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act because of race, religion or political viewpoint. It is concluded that
respondent has failed to establish his claim of physical persecution and
his application for withholding of deportation is denied.

242

As for the contention that the state of destination might at some future
date come under the control of a regime hostile to the alien, the Board
has said: "Such future possibilities are not amenable to proof and
consequently their determination is not amenable to the adjudicative
process. Only where the likelihood of physical persecution presently
exists in a particular situation is withholding of deportation warranted."4

3

Despite the many cases to the contrary, relief has been afforded
deportable aliens under Section 243(h), but always, on "a case-by-case
basis.",2 44 In a 1956 case in which immigration authorities had denied
relief to a relator who anticipated physical persecution if he were
deported to the People's Republic of China because he had been a
landowner in China and a known supporter of the Nationalist
Government, Circuit Judge Jerome Frank said that the standard for
relief under this Section should be proof of a"

. .

. reasonable basis to

fear persecution" which was the same standard observed by the
Immigration and Naturalization Service in its administration of the
relevant sections of the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 and the Refugee
Relief Act of 1953.245 Granting the petition for habeas corpus, he
took judicial notice of the "ruthless behavior" of the Chinese
Communist Government and the probable treatment which the relator
would receive if deported there. 2 4'6A Greek seaman sought relief under
Section 243(h) on grounds that he would be persecuted in Greece for
having criticized economic conditions in the country in the late 1940's
and for his membership in the outlawed Federation of Greek Maritime
242

Matter of Bufalino, 14-15, cited note 145. The Board refused to consider the argument

that deportation is a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to
the Constitution.
243 Matter of Vardjan, 10 1. & N. Dec. 567, cited in Matter of Man, 4, cited note 193.
244 INS ANN. REP. 1964, 13.
245 United States ex rel. Fong Foo v. Shaughnessy, 718, cited note 137. 62 Stat. 1009; 67
Stat. 400.
246 United States ex rel. Fong Foo V. Shaughnessy, 718, cited note 137. Judge Frank
observed that if the Supreme Court could take judicial notice of the end of the yachting season
in northern waters (The Conqueror, 166 U.S. 110 (1897)), he could certainly take judicial
notice of the cruelties practiced by the People's Republic of China.
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Unions.47 His request was denied, however, by the hearing officer
who "..

. felt that there was no basis upon which to conclude that

petitioner would be denied due process of law or a fair trial and hearing
since Greece is a democratic country," 2 48 and his request for a
continuation of the proceedings in order to present witnesses on his
behalf who had personal knowledge of conditions in Greece was also
denied. Holding that a person making a plea of physical persecution
should have the opportunity of presenting the "best possible evidence"
in support of his contention, and hence that the relator had been
denied a full and fair hearing, Judge Weinfeld of the District Court for
the Southern District of New York ordered that the administrative
proceedings be continued.' 49 Another case in which judicial exception
was taken to a denial of relief under Section 243(h) concerned a
Yugoslav national who argued that he would be punished for the
offense of defection if he were deported to that country. 2 5 0 The
Special Inquiry Officer had recognized that the complainant would
probably be prosecuted for defection which was 'a crime cognizable
under the recognized juridical system' of Yugoslavia, but took the
position that such punishment did not constitute "physical persecution," which term should be defined as 'corporal punishment, torture
or death because of race, religion or political opinion."' 2 5 Reversing
the decision of the District Court and remanding the case, Circuit Judge
Waterman held that although imprisonment for a political offense such
as defection might not be considered to constitute physical persecution
within the terms of Section 243(h), the Court could not"

. .

. ascribe

to Congress preclusion" of relief under this provision where an "
alien was threatened with long years of imprisonment, perhaps even life
Circuit Judge Medina, concurring, said with regard to the adverse ruling
of the immigration authorities in this case, "

. .

. the construction thus

given to the statute is not only utterly repugnant to our national
traditions and history, it is also patently inconsistent with the intention
of the Congress in enacting Section 243(h). A decision based upon such
misreading of the law must necessarily be capricious and arbitrary."'2
247
248
249
250
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In United States ex rel. Mercer v. Esperdy, where the relator had
withdrawn an application under Section 243(h) and had later sought to
reapply for relief under this section in the course of deportation
proceedings against her for illegal entry after previous deportation, the
immigration authorities were warned that they should not invoke
"procedural niceties" as a means of disposing of the new application.2 I I District Judge Tenney said:
In view of the fact that a claim of physical persecution which is not
passed upon, can involve the very life of the party asserting it, I believe
that rules of law, and especially rules of procedure and their flexibility,
must be viewed in a much different light than would be the case in a
claim of lesser magnitude. . . . Thus, where, as here, on a claim under
Section 243(h) of the Act wherein there has been no substantive
determination of the application, orderly procedure must be flexible
enough to permit the reopening of previously terminated proceedings
to permit the protection of substantive rights.2
Reversing an order denying withholding of deportation, the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit took exception to the immigration
authorities' narrow interpretation of "physical persecution" which did
not comprehend a denial of employment in the state of destination
because of the alien's religious or political beliefs.' 5 6 Judge Staley
urged that the term must be interpreted so as to take into consideration
the "net effect" of conditions to which the alien would be exposed in
the state of destination:
The statute does not concern itself with the manner in which physical
persecution is inflicted, so long as that is the net effect of the forces or
the circumstances that the Yugoslavian government will impose.
...However there is no basis for thinking that "physical persecution"
requires or even connotes the use of intense physical force applied to
the body with all the dramatics of the rack and wheel. The denial of an
opportunity to earn a livelihood... is the equivalent of a sentence to
death by means of slow starvation and none the less final because it is
gradual. 25 7
warrant withholding of deportation for the former and denial thereof to the latter. Ibid., 36-37.
Diminich v. Esperdy, cited note 139.
254

Cited note 138.

255 Ibid., 615, citing United States ex rel. Fong Foo v. Shaughnessy (cited note 137). Cf.

Leng May Ma v. Barber, cited note 59. The relator submitted in evidence for a new hearing an
affidavit of her brother regarding conditions in Haiti which the Court found ..... compelling
enough to lend at least prima facie credence to relator's assertions and to compel an
administrative decision on their validity." United States ex rel. Mercer v. Esperdy, 615, cited
note 138.
256 Dunat v. Hurney, cited note 139.
257

Ibid., 746.
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IV Conclusions

In any attempt to analyze the practice of political asylum under
the immigration laws, it is an obvious premise that these laws have not
been established for the purpose of facilitating the grant of territorial
asylum in the United States to political refugees. Yet any realistic
appreciation of international conditions since the Second World War
must necessarily take account of the continuing problem of oppression
of peoples on political, racial, and religious grounds in countries around
the world, with the concomitant result of the creation of numerous
active and passive political refugees.' I The United States has
recognized its responsibility to share in the relief of these people, in
part, by enabling some of them to come to this country. Measures
taken by the Executive Branch and Congress to open the way to
territorial asylum by exceptions to or modifications of the stringent
American immigration laws have been summarized earlier in this report.
Yet, despite these efforts-and to bring more than a million refugees
into the country is no mean accomplishment-an ambivalent policy
toward refugees emerges from any recounting of this recent history,
that is, the adjustments in the immigration laws designed to accommodate political refugees have been reluctantly and minimally authorized
by Congress under Executive pressure and have been subject to rigorous
administrative and judicial interpretation.
This ambivalence has been evident in regard to exclusionary laws
and policies. The influx of refugees from the beginning of 1946 to 1951
was associated with the National Origins quota concept of admission.
The Presidential Directive of December 22, 1945, sought to make
unused European quotas available to refugees. The 1948 Displaced
Persons Act provided for the issuance of non-quota visas; but
adjustments in status to permanent residence of refugees who could
have been classified as quota immigrants at the time of entry meant the
reduction of their country's quota by a similar number. The 1953
Refugee Relief Act, the 1957 Refugee-Escapee Act, and the 1960 Fair
Share Act, however, were not tied to this quota "mortgage" system. An
annual maximum limit on immigration was substituted for the National
Origins quota system in 1965. Within this maximum, 10,200 places are
2 58 For

the distinction

between

active and passive political offenses, see Evans,

"Reflections upon the Political Offense in International Practice," 18 ff., cited note 55. See
also, p. 11 above. The Legal Committee of the United Nations adopted a declaration on
territorial asylum in November 1967, which follows the traditional position that the political
refugee has no right to demand asylum. The declaration establishes certain standards for the
treatment of refugees admitted to territorial asylum. New York Times, Nov. 2, 1967, 1:7.
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reserved each year for the "conditional entry" of refugees. By a proviso
to Section 203(a)(7), half of these conditional entry places may be
used, instead, for the adjustment of status of refugees already in the
country. The allocation of a "quota" to refugees is a step forward in
the recognition of a basic humanitarian responsibility. As suggested in
the discussion of Section 203(a)(7) above, however, the relatively few
administrative or judicial decisions in cases reported to date in which
relief has been sought under the proviso indicate that this aspect of the
law will be conservatively interpreted.' 5 9
This same ambivalence has been evident, too, in the definition of
"physical persecution" as used in Section 243(h) before the text was
revised in 1965. "Physical persecution" appeared first in Section 23 of
the Internal Security Act of 1950 and was repeated in Section 243(h)
in 1952. But whereas the 1950 Act predicated relief under this
phraseology upon a finding by the Attorney General that the
deportable applicant would be subject to physical persecution in the
proposed state of destination, the 1952 Act authorized the Attorney
General to grant relief only if in his opinion the alien would be subject
to physical persecution in the destination. Although the burden of
proof was on the alien in both situations, the element of administrative
discretion was much stronger in the second. By a gradual process of
judicial interpretation from 1952 to 1965, however, limits were placed
upon the scope of this discretion. It may reasonably be concluded that
judicial concern for possible abuse of the discretionary authority
provided for in Section 243(h), whether manifested in a denial of due
process of law or in an arbitrary or capricious decision, reflects that
increasing public concern for human rights which has been evident both
nationally and internationally since the end of the Second World War.
But this same judicial concern has also been circumscribed by judicial
restraint in the face of a discretionary administrative procedure with
foreign policy implications.
The term "physical persecution" was not defined in the Acts ot
1950 or 1952, nor in the administrative regulations implementing the
latter; but its scope was clarified in subsequent practice. In 1958, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service offered the following definition
of "physical persecution":
Physical persecution contemplates incarceration or subjection to
corporal punishment, torture, or death based usually on one's race,
2s9

Of 14 cases recently decided under the proviso to § 203(a)(7), 10 applications were

denied.
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religion, or political opinions. Conviction followed by imprisonment for
crimes, cognizable as such under generally recognised civilized juridical
systems, is not physical persecution. Economic sanctions applied
against those not members of the controlling clique in a country whose
economic system is completely and rigidly state-controlled is not
physical persecution. 2 6
In the course of the next seven years, the definition acquired some
glosses, especially in administrative proceedings. The term "crimes"
could be understood to include common crimes or delits mixtes, i.e.
offenses involving both common crime and political elements, 2 6 1 and
"civilized juridical systems" could comprehend proceedings before both
civil and military tribunals. 2 6 2 The political prominence or obscurity
of the alien vis d vis the affairs of the state of proposed destination was
introduced as a possible controlling factor; for example, a Svetlana
Alliluyeva would have more prospect of relief under Section 243(h)
2
proceedings than would a schoolteacher who defected from Poland. 6 3
Overt opposition to the government of the state of destination as
demonstrated by joining protest groups in the United States or making
public statements here against such government was not thought to
26
justify relief. 4
But at the same time, some restrictions were placed upon the
scope of the definition. The prospect of "

. .

. long years of imprison-

ment, perhaps even life imprisonment... " for defection 2 65 could
provide an exception to the uncritical acceptance of criminal prosecution in the state of destination envisaged in the Kale definition of
Section 243(h); and economic proscription could be understood to be a
more serious matter than the "economic sanctions" tolerated in the
Kale definition. 6 6 In dicta the Board of Immigration Appeals
acknowledged that physical persecution could comprehend such situations as deportation of an alien from the state of destination where he
260
261

In re Kale, 3, cited note 188.
See, Matter of Liao, cited note 188; Chao-ling Wang v. Pilliod, cited note 135; Matter

of Torres Tejeda, cited note 187. Cf., In re Gonzalez, 217 F.Supp. 717 (S.D.N.Y.
1963)(extradition of fugitive to Dominican Republic on charges constituting delits mixtes in
which the common crime element was considered dominant.)
262 Zupicich v. Esperdy, cited note 137; Kalatjis v. Rosenberg, cited note 147; Chao-ling
Wang v. Pilliod, cited note 135.
263 See, note 3. See, Matter of Bukowska, cited note 192; Matter of Vardjan, cited note
165; Matter of Stojkovic, cited note 164. This same factor has worked to the advantage of
Cardinal Mindszenty, see note 3. Cf., Matter of Adamska, cited note 100 (§ 203(a)(7) provided
relief not available under § 243(h).)
264 E.g., Matter of Nghiem, cited note 173; Matter of Sihasale, cited note 186.
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had strong personal ties to that state or as the subjection of a member
of a deposed government to potential mob violence. 2 6 7 The total
effort at definition was not significantly advanced, however, by judicial
tests such as a "reasonable basis to fear persecution ' 2 6 8 or consideration of the "net effect" of the conditions existing in the state of
destination which might lead to persecution.6 9 On balance, the Kale
definition and its glosses amounted to a stringent interpretation of
Section 243(h), hardly affected by the few attempts at mitigation. Yet,
the House of Representatives in its 1965 report on the proposed
amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act appears to have
taken some cognizance of the stringency of the Kale definition in
noting that "[t]echniques of persecution are not limited to bodily
violence alone," 2 70 and revising Section 243(h) so as to comprehend
the formula, "fear of persecution on account of race, religion or
political opinion," which had been used in the 1948 Displaced Persons
Act and its 1950 amendment, the 1953 Refugee Relief Act, and in the
1957 Refugee-Escapee Act.
It is one thing to change the text of Section 243(h) and another
thing to change the interpretation thereof. The few cases reported since
this amendment became effective in October 1965, do not suggest that
the new formula can be characterized as more liberal in application
than was its predecessor.2 7 ' The real difficulty lies in the administrative proceedings with particular reference to the evidentiary basis
upon which the application for relief under Section 243(h) is
predicated. As indicated above, it is no easy matter for an alien to prove
his contention that he would be subjected to persecution in the state of
proposed destination; neither administrative nor judicial tribunals will
be receptive to surmise, conjecture, unverified or second-hand reports,
or to arguments which thrust to the internal politics of a foreign state.
Immigration statistics are not clear as to the treatment of political
refugees under the law, for example, as to the number of refugees who
267 Matter of Stojkovich, cited note 164; Matter of Diaz, cited note 171.
268 United States ex rel. Fong Foo v. Shaughnessy, 718, cited note 137.
269 Dunat v. Hurney, cited note 139.
270 Cited note 85.
271 E.g., Matter of Bufalino, cited note 145; Matter of De Lucia, cited note 124; Matter of
Kojoory, cited note 166; Matter of Man, cited note 193; Matter of Nagy, cited note 166; Matter
of Nghiem, cited note 173; Matter of Sihasale, cited note 186; Matter of Sun, cited note 190.
See also, Cheng Kai Fu v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, cited note 124; Lena v.
Immigration and Naturalization Service, cited note 139; Novinc v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service, cited note 145; Sui Fung Luk v. Rosenberg, cited note 99; United States
ex rel. Kordic v. Esperdy, cited note 98; and Kwong Chau v. Esperdy, 276 F.Supp. 897
(S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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are excluded, paroled into the country, enter conditionally, who are
present under indefinite voluntary departure status, deported, or who
have received relief under Section 243(h). In 1966, the 302 applications
for relief under Section 243(h) were reported to represent an 18%
increase over the figure for 1965,2

72

but there was no indication as to

how many of the applications were granted. Deportation figures for
1966, note that one refugee was deported and that 81 refugees were
requested to depart.73 Yet, in this same year, 132,851 aliens were
expelled from the country; there were 876 exclusion hearings and
16,767 deportation hearings. 2

74

The conclusion, based upon an examination of reported administrative and judicial practice and limited statistical evidence, suggests that
most refugees who are in this country on conditional entry or parole or
in indefinite voluntary departure status are reasonably sure of enjoying
political asylum as long as they observe their responsibilities as
law-abiding persons. Where deportation proceedings are instituted
against a refugee who then seeks to have deportation withheld by
invoking Section 243(h), the prospects for relief are very limited.
Although the immigration laws, and in particular, the provisions
regarding expulsion, are not designed specifically with a view to serving
the interests of political refugees, the conclusion cannot be avoided that
the continued rigorous interpretation of Section 243(h) does not seem
to be consonant with the objectives of Congress in modifying this
section of the law in 1965 nor entirely compatible with the broadly
humanitarian policies of the United States designed to alleviate the
condition of political oppressed persons which have been followed since
the Second World War.

272 INS ANN. REP. 1966, 19. Fear of persecution has been expressed with regard to some
62 countries ranging from Afghanistan to Yemen. Ibid. Between 1953 and 1956, there were
2364 applications for relief under § 243(h); 738 applications were granted, and 507 were
denied. Ibid., 1953, 42-43; 1954, 42; 1955, 18; 1956, 16. There were 890 applications in 1960,
526 in 1963, c. 257 in 1964, and 257 in 1965. Ibid., 1960, 13; 1963, 13; 1964, 14; 1965, 14.
The Annual Reports do not indicate how many applications were granted in the years 1960,

1963-1965.
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